{"ID": "T1189", "name": "Drive-by Compromise", "text": "Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. With this technique, the user's web browser is typically targeted for exploitation, but adversaries may also use compromised websites for non-exploitation behavior such as acquiring Application Access Token. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., Drive-by Target), including:  A legitimate website is compromised where adversaries have injected some form of malicious code such as JavaScript, iFrames, and cross-site scripting  Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary  Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., Malvertising)  Built-in web application interfaces are leveraged for the insertion of any other kind of object that can be used to display web content or contain a script that executes on the visiting client (e.g. forum posts, comments, and other user controllable web content). Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring. Typical drive-by compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version.  The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, then it will give the adversary code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place.  In some cases a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike Exploit Public-Facing Application, the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ. Adversaries may also use compromised websites to deliver a user to a malicious application designed to Steal Application Access Tokens, like OAuth tokens, to gain access to protected applications and information. These malicious applications have been delivered through popups on legitimate websites.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "Firewalls and proxies can inspect URLs for potentially known-bad domains or parameters. They can also do reputation-based analytics on websites and their requested resources such as how old a domain is, who it's registered to, if it's on a known bad list, or how many other users have connected to it before. Network intrusion detection systems, sometimes with SSL/TLS inspection, can be used to look for known malicious scripts (recon, heap spray, and browser identification scripts have been frequently reused), common script obfuscation, and exploit code. Detecting compromise based on the drive-by exploit from a legitimate website may be difficult. Also look for behavior on the endpoint system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of browser processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution, evidence of Discovery, or other unusual network traffic that may indicate additional tools transferred to the system.", "platforms": "Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1190", "name": "Exploit Public-Facing Application", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to exploit a weakness in an Internet-facing host or system to initially access a network. The weakness in the system can be a software bug, a temporary glitch, or a misconfiguration. Exploited applications are often websites/web servers, but can also include databases (like SQL), standard services (like SMB or SSH), network device administration and management protocols (like SNMP and Smart Install), and any other system with Internet accessible open sockets. Depending on the flaw being exploited this may also involve Exploitation for Defense Evasion. If an application is hosted on cloud-based infrastructure and/or is containerized, then exploiting it may lead to compromise of the underlying instance or container. This can allow an adversary a path to access the cloud or container APIs, exploit container host access via Escape to Host, or take advantage of weak identity and access management policies. Adversaries may also exploit edge network infrastructure and related appliances, specifically targeting devices that do not support robust host-based defenses. For websites and databases, the OWASP top 10 and CWE top 25 highlight the most common web-based vulnerabilities.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1566", "name": "Phishing", "text": "Adversaries may send phishing messages to gain access to victim systems. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. Phishing can be targeted, known as spearphishing. In spearphishing, a specific individual, company, or industry will be targeted by the adversary. More generally, adversaries can conduct non-targeted phishing, such as in mass malware spam campaigns. Adversaries may send victims emails containing malicious attachments or links, typically to execute malicious code on victim systems. Phishing may also be conducted via third-party services, like social media platforms. Phishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source, as well as evasive techniques such as removing or manipulating emails or metadata/headers from compromised accounts being abused to send messages (e.g., Email Hiding Rules). Another way to accomplish this is by forging or spoofing the identity of the sender which can be used to fool both the human recipient as well as automated security tools. Victims may also receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools onto their computer (i.e., User Execution).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways can be used to detect phishing with malicious attachments in transit. Detonation chambers may also be used to identify malicious attachments. Solutions can be signature and behavior based, but adversaries may construct attachments in a way to avoid these systems. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Because most common third-party services used for phishing via service leverage TLS encryption, SSL/TLS inspection is generally required to detect the initial communication/delivery. With SSL/TLS inspection intrusion detection signatures or other security gateway appliances may be able to detect malware. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded on the user's computer. Many possible detections of follow-on behavior may take place once User Execution occurs.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1566.002", "name": "Phishing: Spearphishing Link", "text": "Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious link in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing with a link is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of links to download malware contained in email, instead of attaching malicious files to the email itself, to avoid defenses that may inspect email attachments. Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this case, the malicious emails contain links. Generally, the links will be accompanied by social engineering text and require the user to actively click or copy and paste a URL into a browser, leveraging User Execution. The visited website may compromise the web browser using an exploit, or the user will be prompted to download applications, documents, zip files, or even executables depending on the pretext for the email in the first place. Adversaries may also include links that are intended to interact directly with an email reader, including embedded images intended to exploit the end system directly. Additionally, adversaries may use seemingly benign links that abuse special characters to mimic legitimate websites (known as an \"IDN homograph attack\"). URLs may also be obfuscated by taking advantage of quirks in the URL schema, such as the acceptance of integer- or hexadecimal-based hostname formats and the automatic discarding of text before an \u201c@\u201d symbol: for example, `hxxp://google.com@1157586937`. Adversaries may also utilize links to perform consent phishing, typically with OAuth 2.0 request URLs that when accepted by the user provide permissions/access for malicious applications, allowing adversaries to Steal Application Access Tokens. These stolen access tokens allow the adversary to perform various actions on behalf of the user via API calls.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "URL inspection within email (including expanding shortened links) can help detect links leading to known malicious sites as well as links redirecting to adversary infrastructure based by upon suspicious OAuth patterns with unusual TLDs.. Detonation chambers can be used to detect these links and either automatically go to these sites to determine if they're potentially malicious, or wait and capture the content if a user visits the link. Filtering based on DKIM+SPF or header analysis can help detect when the email sender is spoofed. Because this technique usually involves user interaction on the endpoint, many of the possible detections take place once User Execution occurs.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1566"}
{"ID": "T1566.004", "name": "Phishing: Spearphishing Voice", "text": "Adversaries may use voice communications to ultimately gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing voice is a specific variant of spearphishing. It is different from other forms of spearphishing in that is employs the use of manipulating a user into providing access to systems through a phone call or other forms of voice communications. Spearphishing frequently involves social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source (ex: Impersonation) and/or creating a sense of urgency or alarm for the recipient. All forms of phishing are electronically delivered social engineering. In this scenario, adversaries are not directly sending malware to a victim vice relying on User Execution for delivery and execution. For example, victims may receive phishing messages that instruct them to call a phone number where they are directed to visit a malicious URL, download malware, or install adversary-accessible remote management tools (Remote Access Software) onto their computer. Adversaries may also combine voice phishing with Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation in order to trick users into divulging MFA credentials or accepting authentication prompts.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/004", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1566"}
{"ID": "T1199", "name": "Trusted Relationship", "text": "Adversaries may breach or otherwise leverage organizations who have access to intended victims. Access through trusted third party relationship abuses an existing connection that may not be protected or receives less scrutiny than standard mechanisms of gaining access to a network. Organizations often grant elevated access to second or third-party external providers in order to allow them to manage internal systems as well as cloud-based environments. Some examples of these relationships include IT services contractors, managed security providers, infrastructure contractors (e.g. HVAC, elevators, physical security). The third-party provider's access may be intended to be limited to the infrastructure being maintained, but may exist on the same network as the rest of the enterprise. As such, Valid Accounts used by the other party for access to internal network systems may be compromised and used. In Office 365 environments, organizations may grant Microsoft partners or resellers delegated administrator permissions. By compromising a partner or reseller account, an adversary may be able to leverage existing delegated administrator relationships or send new delegated administrator offers to clients in order to gain administrative control over the victim tenant.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1199", "tactics": "Initial Access", "detection": "Establish monitoring for activity conducted by second and third party providers and other trusted entities that may be leveraged as a means to gain access to the network. Depending on the type of relationship, an adversary may have access to significant amounts of information about the target before conducting an operation, especially if the trusted relationship is based on IT services. Adversaries may be able to act quickly towards an objective, so proper monitoring for behavior related to Credential Access, Lateral Movement, and Collection will be important to detect the intrusion.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1078", "name": "Valid Accounts", "text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of existing accounts as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Compromised credentials may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access, network devices, and remote desktop. Compromised credentials may also grant an adversary increased privilege to specific systems or access to restricted areas of the network. Adversaries may choose not to use malware or tools in conjunction with the legitimate access those credentials provide to make it harder to detect their presence. In some cases, adversaries may abuse inactive accounts: for example, those belonging to individuals who are no longer part of an organization. Using these accounts may allow the adversary to evade detection, as the original account user will not be present to identify any anomalous activity taking place on their account. The overlap of permissions for local, domain, and cloud accounts across a network of systems is of concern because the adversary may be able to pivot across accounts and systems to reach a high level of access (i.e., domain or enterprise administrator) to bypass access controls set within the enterprise.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect accounts that may have been created by an adversary for persistence. Checks on these accounts could also include whether default accounts such as Guest have been activated. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "Anti-virus, Application Control, Firewall, Host Intrusion Prevention Systems, Network Intrusion Detection System, System Access Controls"}
{"ID": "T1078.004", "name": "Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts", "text": "Valid accounts in cloud environments may allow adversaries to perform actions to achieve Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. Cloud Accounts can exist solely in the cloud or be hybrid joined between on-premises systems and the cloud through federation with other identity sources such as Windows Active Directory. Service or user accounts may be targeted by adversaries through Brute Force, Phishing, or various other means to gain access to the environment. Federated accounts may be a pathway for the adversary to affect both on-premises systems and cloud environments. An adversary may create long lasting Additional Cloud Credentials on a compromised cloud account to maintain persistence in the environment. Such credentials may also be used to bypass security controls such as multi-factor authentication. Cloud accounts may also be able to assume Temporary Elevated Cloud Access or other privileges through various means within the environment. Misconfigurations in role assignments or role assumption policies may allow an adversary to use these mechanisms to leverage permissions outside the intended scope of the account. Such over privileged accounts may be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases through Cloud API or other methods.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/004", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1078"}
{"ID": "T1078.001", "name": "Valid Accounts: Default Accounts", "text": "Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a default account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Default accounts are those that are built-into an OS, such as the Guest or Administrator accounts on Windows systems. Default accounts also include default factory/provider set accounts on other types of systems, software, or devices, including the root user account in AWS and the default service account in Kubernetes. Default accounts are not limited to client machines, rather also include accounts that are preset for equipment such as network devices and computer applications whether they are internal, open source, or commercial. Appliances that come preset with a username and password combination pose a serious threat to organizations that do not change it post installation, as they are easy targets for an adversary. Similarly, adversaries may also utilize publicly disclosed or stolen Private Keys or credential materials to legitimately connect to remote environments via Remote Services.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1078/001", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor whether default accounts have been activated or logged into. These audits should also include checks on any appliances and applications for default credentials or SSH keys, and if any are discovered, they should be updated immediately.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1078"}
{"ID": "T1651", "name": "Cloud Administration Command", "text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud management services to execute commands within virtual machines or hybrid-joined devices. Resources such as AWS Systems Manager, Azure RunCommand, and Runbooks allow users to remotely run scripts in virtual machines by leveraging installed virtual machine agents. Similarly, in Azure AD environments, Microsoft Endpoint Manager allows Global or Intune Administrators to run scripts as SYSTEM on on-premises devices joined to the Azure AD. If an adversary gains administrative access to a cloud environment, they may be able to abuse cloud management services to execute commands in the environment\u2019s virtual machines or on-premises hybrid-joined devices. Additionally, an adversary that compromises a service provider or delegated administrator account may similarly be able to leverage a Trusted Relationship to execute commands in connected virtual machines.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1651", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, IaaS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1059", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter", "text": "Adversaries may abuse command and script interpreters to execute commands, scripts, or binaries. These interfaces and languages provide ways of interacting with computer systems and are a common feature across many different platforms. Most systems come with some built-in command-line interface and scripting capabilities, for example, macOS and Linux distributions include some flavor of Unix Shell while Windows installations include the Windows Command Shell and PowerShell. There are also cross-platform interpreters such as Python, as well as those commonly associated with client applications such as JavaScript and Visual Basic. Adversaries may abuse these technologies in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. Commands and scripts can be embedded in Initial Access payloads delivered to victims as lure documents or as secondary payloads downloaded from an existing C2. Adversaries may also execute commands through interactive terminals/shells, as well as utilize various Remote Services in order to achieve remote Execution.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "Command-line and scripting activities can be captured through proper logging of process execution with command-line arguments. This information can be useful in gaining additional insight to adversaries' actions through how they use native processes or custom tools. Also monitor for loading of modules associated with specific languages. If scripting is restricted for normal users, then any attempt to enable scripts running on a system would be considered suspicious. If scripts are not commonly used on a system, but enabled, scripts running out of cycle from patching or other administrator functions are suspicious. Scripts should be captured from the file system when possible to determine their actions and intent. Scripts are likely to perform actions with various effects on a system that may generate events, depending on the types of monitoring used. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for script execution and subsequent behavior. Actions may be related to network and system information discovery, collection, or other scriptable post-compromise behaviors and could be used as indicators of detection leading back to the source script.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, Script: Script Execution", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1059.009", "name": "Command and Scripting Interpreter: Cloud API", "text": "Adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to execute malicious commands. APIs available in cloud environments provide various functionalities and are a feature-rich method for programmatic access to nearly all aspects of a tenant. These APIs may be utilized through various methods such as command line interpreters (CLIs), in-browser Cloud Shells, PowerShell modules like Azure for PowerShell, or software developer kits (SDKs) available for languages such as Python. Cloud API functionality may allow for administrative access across all major services in a tenant such as compute, storage, identity and access management (IAM), networking, and security policies. With proper permissions (often via use of credentials such as Application Access Token and Web Session Cookie), adversaries may abuse cloud APIs to invoke various functions that execute malicious actions. For example, CLI and PowerShell functionality may be accessed through binaries installed on cloud-hosted or on-premises hosts or accessed through a browser-based cloud shell offered by many cloud platforms (such as AWS, Azure, and GCP). These cloud shells are often a packaged unified environment to use CLI and/or scripting modules hosted as a container in the cloud environment.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1059/009", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1059"}
{"ID": "T1648", "name": "Serverless Execution", "text": "Adversaries may abuse serverless computing, integration, and automation services to execute arbitrary code in cloud environments. Many cloud providers offer a variety of serverless resources, including compute engines, application integration services, and web servers. Adversaries may abuse these resources in various ways as a means of executing arbitrary commands. For example, adversaries may use serverless functions to execute malicious code, such as crypto-mining malware (i.e. Resource Hijacking). Adversaries may also create functions that enable further compromise of the cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use the `IAM:PassRole` permission in AWS or the `iam.serviceAccounts.actAs` permission in Google Cloud to add Additional Cloud Roles to a serverless cloud function, which may then be able to perform actions the original user cannot. Serverless functions can also be invoked in response to cloud events (i.e. Event Triggered Execution), potentially enabling persistent execution over time. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary may create a Lambda function that automatically adds Additional Cloud Credentials to a user and a corresponding CloudWatch events rule that invokes that function whenever a new user is created. Similarly, an adversary may create a Power Automate workflow in Office 365 environments that forwards all emails a user receives or creates anonymous sharing links whenever a user is granted access to a document in SharePoint.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1648", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1204", "name": "User Execution", "text": "An adversary may rely upon specific actions by a user in order to gain execution. Users may be subjected to social engineering to get them to execute malicious code by, for example, opening a malicious document file or link. These user actions will typically be observed as follow-on behavior from forms of Phishing. While User Execution frequently occurs shortly after Initial Access it may occur at other phases of an intrusion, such as when an adversary places a file in a shared directory or on a user's desktop hoping that a user will click on it. This activity may also be seen shortly after Internal Spearphishing. Adversaries may also deceive users into performing actions such as enabling Remote Access Software, allowing direct control of the system to the adversary, or downloading and executing malware for User Execution. For example, tech support scams can be facilitated through Phishing, vishing, or various forms of user interaction. Adversaries can use a combination of these methods, such as spoofing and promoting toll-free numbers or call centers that are used to direct victims to malicious websites, to deliver and execute payloads containing malware or Remote Access Software.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "Monitor the execution of and command-line arguments for applications that may be used by an adversary to gain Initial Access that require user interaction. This includes compression applications, such as those for zip files, that can be used to Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information in payloads. Anti-virus can potentially detect malicious documents and files that are downloaded and executed on the user's computer. Endpoint sensing or network sensing can potentially detect malicious events once the file is opened (such as a Microsoft Word document or PDF reaching out to the internet or spawning powershell.exe).", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Container: Container Creation, Container: Container Start, File: File Creation, Image: Image Creation, Instance: Instance Creation, Instance: Instance Start, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1204.003", "name": "User Execution: Malicious Image", "text": "Adversaries may rely on a user running a malicious image to facilitate execution. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be backdoored. Backdoored images may be uploaded to a public repository via Upload Malware, and users may then download and deploy an instance or container from the image without realizing the image is malicious, thus bypassing techniques that specifically achieve Initial Access. This can lead to the execution of malicious code, such as code that executes cryptocurrency mining, in the instance or container. Adversaries may also name images a certain way to increase the chance of users mistakenly deploying an instance or container from the image (ex: Match Legitimate Name or Location).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204/003", "tactics": "Execution", "detection": "Monitor the local image registry to make sure malicious images are not added. Track the deployment of new containers, especially from newly built images. Monitor the behavior of containers within the environment to detect anomalous behavior or malicious activity after users deploy from malicious images.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Container: Container Creation, Container: Container Start, Image: Image Creation, Instance: Instance Creation, Instance: Instance Start", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1204"}
{"ID": "T1098", "name": "Account Manipulation", "text": "Adversaries may manipulate accounts to maintain and/or elevate access to victim systems. Account manipulation may consist of any action that preserves or modifies adversary access to a compromised account, such as modifying credentials or permission groups. These actions could also include account activity designed to subvert security policies, such as performing iterative password updates to bypass password duration policies and preserve the life of compromised credentials. In order to create or manipulate accounts, the adversary must already have sufficient permissions on systems or the domain. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Collect events that correlate with changes to account objects and/or permissions on systems and the domain, such as event IDs 4738, 4728 and 4670. Monitor for modification of accounts in correlation with other suspicious activity. Changes may occur at unusual times or from unusual systems. Especially flag events where the subject and target accounts differ or that include additional flags such as changing a password without knowledge of the old password. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity. Monitor for unusual permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. However, account manipulation may also lead to privilege escalation where modifications grant access to additional roles, permissions, or higher-privileged Valid Accounts", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Group: Group Modification, Process: Process Creation, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1098.001", "name": "Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials", "text": "Adversaries may add adversary-controlled credentials to a cloud account to maintain persistent access to victim accounts and instances within the environment. For example, adversaries may add credentials for Service Principals and Applications in addition to existing legitimate credentials in Azure AD. These credentials include both x509 keys and passwords. With sufficient permissions, there are a variety of ways to add credentials including the Azure Portal, Azure command line interface, and Azure or Az PowerShell modules. In infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments, after gaining access through Cloud Accounts, adversaries may generate or import their own SSH keys using either the CreateKeyPair or ImportKeyPair API in AWS or the gcloud compute os-login ssh-keys add command in GCP. This allows persistent access to instances within the cloud environment without further usage of the compromised cloud accounts. Adversaries may also use the CreateAccessKey API in AWS or the gcloud iam service-accounts keys create command in GCP to add access keys to an account. If the target account has different permissions from the requesting account, the adversary may also be able to escalate their privileges in the environment (i.e. Cloud Accounts). For example, in Azure AD environments, an adversary with the Application Administrator role can add a new set of credentials to their application's service principal. In doing so the adversary would be able to access the service principal\u2019s roles and permissions, which may be different from those of the Application Administrator. In AWS environments, adversaries with the appropriate permissions may also use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a temporary set of credentials tied to the permissions of the original user account. These credentials may remain valid for the duration of their lifetime even if the original account\u2019s API credentials are deactivated.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/001", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor Azure Activity Logs for Service Principal and Application modifications. Monitor for the usage of APIs that create or import SSH keys, particularly by unexpected users or accounts such as the root account. Monitor for use of credentials at unusual times or to unusual systems or services. This may also correlate with other suspicious activity.", "platforms": "Azure AD, IaaS, SaaS", "data sources": "User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1098"}
{"ID": "T1098.003", "name": "Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Roles", "text": "An adversary may add additional roles or permissions to an adversary-controlled cloud account to maintain persistent access to a tenant. For example, adversaries may update IAM policies in cloud-based environments or add a new global administrator in Office 365 environments. With sufficient permissions, a compromised account can gain almost unlimited access to data and settings (including the ability to reset the passwords of other admins). This account modification may immediately follow Create Account or other malicious account activity. Adversaries may also modify existing Valid Accounts that they have compromised. This could lead to privilege escalation, particularly if the roles added allow for lateral movement to additional accounts. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary with appropriate permissions may be able to use the CreatePolicyVersion API to define a new version of an IAM policy or the AttachUserPolicy API to attach an IAM policy with additional or distinct permissions to a compromised user account.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/003", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Collect activity logs from IAM services and cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1098"}
{"ID": "T1098.002", "name": "Account Manipulation: Additional Email Delegate Permissions", "text": "Adversaries may grant additional permission levels to maintain persistent access to an adversary-controlled email account. For example, the Add-MailboxPermission PowerShell cmdlet, available in on-premises Exchange and in the cloud-based service Office 365, adds permissions to a mailbox. In Google Workspace, delegation can be enabled via the Google Admin console and users can delegate accounts via their Gmail settings. Adversaries may also assign mailbox folder permissions through individual folder permissions or roles. In Office 365 environments, adversaries may assign the Default or Anonymous user permissions or roles to the Top of Information Store (root), Inbox, or other mailbox folders. By assigning one or both user permissions to a folder, the adversary can utilize any other account in the tenant to maintain persistence to the target user\u2019s mail folders. This may be used in persistent threat incidents as well as BEC (Business Email Compromise) incidents where an adversary can add Additional Cloud Roles to the accounts they wish to compromise. This may further enable use of additional techniques for gaining access to systems. For example, compromised business accounts are often used to send messages to other accounts in the network of the target business while creating inbox rules (ex: Internal Spearphishing), so the messages evade spam/phishing detection mechanisms.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/002", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor for unusual Exchange and Office 365 email account permissions changes that may indicate excessively broad permissions being granted to compromised accounts. Enable the UpdateFolderPermissions action for all logon types. The mailbox audit log will forward folder permission modification events to the Unified Audit Log. Create rules to alert on ModifyFolderPermissions operations where the Anonymous or Default user is assigned permissions other than None. A larger than normal volume of emails sent from an account and similar phishing emails sent from real accounts within a network may be a sign that an account was compromised and attempts to leverage access with modified email permissions is occurring.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Group: Group Modification, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1098"}
{"ID": "T1098.005", "name": "Account Manipulation: Device Registration", "text": "Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user\u2019s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network. In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device to Azure AD and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies. Devices registered in Azure AD may be able to conduct Internal Spearphishing campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client. Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a Service Exhaustion Flood on an Azure AD tenant by registering a large number of devices.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, SaaS, Windows", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1098"}
{"ID": "T1098.004", "name": "Account Manipulation: SSH Authorized Keys", "text": "Adversaries may modify the SSH authorizedkeys file in SSH specifies the SSH keys that can be used for logging into the user account for which the file is configured. This file is usually found in the user's home directory under <user-home>/.ssh/authorizedconfig. Adversaries may modify SSH authorizedkeys file of a particular virtual machine via the command line interface or rest API. For example, by using the Google Cloud CLI\u2019s \u201cadd-metadata\u201d command an adversary may add SSH keys to a user account. Similarly, in Azure, an adversary may update the authorizedkeys files are modified via cloud APIs or command line interfaces, an adversary may achieve privilege escalation on the target virtual machine if they add a key to a higher-privileged user. SSH keys can also be added to accounts on network devices, such as with the `ip ssh pubkey-chain` Network Device CLI command.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/004", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Use file integrity monitoring to detect changes made to the authorizedkeys file. In cloud environments, monitor instances for modification of metadata and configurations. Monitor for changes to and suspicious processes modifiying /etc/ssh/sshd_config. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for rogue SSH keys being added to accounts.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Network, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1098"}
{"ID": "T1136", "name": "Create Account", "text": "Adversaries may create an account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, creating such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that do not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. Accounts may be created on the local system or within a domain or cloud tenant. In cloud environments, adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific services, which can reduce the chance of detection.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Monitor for processes and command-line parameters associated with account creation, such as net user or useradd. Collect data on account creation within a network. Event ID 4720 is generated when a user account is created on a Windows system and domain controller. Perform regular audits of domain and local system accounts to detect suspicious accounts that may have been created by an adversary. Collect usage logs from cloud administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, User Account: User Account Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1136.003", "name": "Create Account: Cloud Account", "text": "Adversaries may create a cloud account to maintain access to victim systems. With a sufficient level of access, such accounts may be used to establish secondary credentialed access that does not require persistent remote access tools to be deployed on the system. Adversaries may create accounts that only have access to specific cloud services, which can reduce the chance of detection. Once an adversary has created a cloud account, they can then manipulate that account to ensure persistence and allow access to additional resources - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Credentials or assigning Additional Cloud Roles.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1136/003", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Collect usage logs from cloud user and administrator accounts to identify unusual activity in the creation of new accounts and assignment of roles to those accounts. Monitor for accounts assigned to admin roles that go over a certain threshold of known admins.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "User Account: User Account Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1136"}
{"ID": "T1546", "name": "Event Triggered Execution", "text": "Adversaries may establish persistence and/or elevate privileges using system mechanisms that trigger execution based on specific events. Various operating systems have means to monitor and subscribe to events such as logons or other user activity such as running specific applications/binaries. Cloud environments may also support various functions and services that monitor and can be invoked in response to specific cloud events. Adversaries may abuse these mechanisms as a means of maintaining persistent access to a victim via repeatedly executing malicious code. After gaining access to a victim system, adversaries may create/modify event triggers to point to malicious content that will be executed whenever the event trigger is invoked. Since the execution can be proxied by an account with higher permissions, such as SYSTEM or service accounts, an adversary may be able to abuse these triggered execution mechanisms to escalate their privileges.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1546", "tactics": "Persistence, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitoring for additions or modifications of mechanisms that could be used to trigger event-based execution, especially the addition of abnormal commands such as execution of unknown programs, opening network sockets, or reaching out across the network. Also look for changes that do not line up with updates, patches, or other planned administrative activity. These mechanisms may vary by OS, but are typically stored in central repositories that store configuration information such as the Windows Registry, Common Information Model (CIM), and/or specific named files, the last of which can be hashed and compared to known good values. Monitor for processes, API/System calls, and other common ways of manipulating these event repositories. Tools such as Sysinternals Autoruns can be used to detect changes to execution triggers that could be attempts at persistence. Also look for abnormal process call trees for execution of other commands that could relate to Discovery actions or other techniques. Monitor DLL loads by processes, specifically looking for DLLs that are not recognized or not normally loaded into a process. Look for abnormal process behavior that may be due to a process loading a malicious DLL. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as making network connections for Command and Control, learning details about the environment through Discovery, and conducting Lateral Movement.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1525", "name": "Implant Internal Image", "text": "Adversaries may implant cloud or container images with malicious code to establish persistence after gaining access to an environment. Amazon Web Services (AWS) Amazon Machine Images (AMIs), Google Cloud Platform (GCP) Images, and Azure Images as well as popular container runtimes such as Docker can be implanted or backdoored. Unlike Upload Malware, this technique focuses on adversaries implanting an image in a registry within a victim\u2019s environment. Depending on how the infrastructure is provisioned, this could provide persistent access if the infrastructure provisioning tool is instructed to always use the latest image. A tool has been developed to facilitate planting backdoors in cloud container images. If an adversary has access to a compromised AWS instance, and permissions to list the available container images, they may implant a backdoor such as a Web Shell.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1525", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Monitor interactions with images and containers by users to identify ones that are added or modified anomalously. In containerized environments, changes may be detectable by monitoring the Docker daemon logs or setting up and monitoring Kubernetes audit logs depending on registry configuration.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS", "data sources": "Image: Image Creation, Image: Image Metadata, Image: Image Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1556", "name": "Modify Authentication Process", "text": "Adversaries may modify authentication mechanisms and processes to access user credentials or enable otherwise unwarranted access to accounts. The authentication process is handled by mechanisms, such as the Local Security Authentication Server (LSASS) process and the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on Windows, pluggable authentication modules (PAM) on Unix-based systems, and authorization plugins on MacOS systems, responsible for gathering, storing, and validating credentials. By modifying an authentication process, an adversary may be able to authenticate to a service or system without using Valid Accounts. Adversaries may maliciously modify a part of this process to either reveal credentials or bypass authentication mechanisms. Compromised credentials or access may be used to bypass access controls placed on various resources on systems within the network and may even be used for persistent access to remote systems and externally available services, such as VPNs, Outlook Web Access and remote desktop.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556", "tactics": "Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence", "detection": "Monitor for new, unfamiliar DLL files written to a domain controller and/or local computer. Monitor for changes to Registry entries for password filters (ex: HKEYMACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\Notification Packages) and correlate then investigate the DLL files these files reference. Password filters will also show up as an autorun and loaded DLL in lsass.exe. Monitor for calls to OpenProcess that can be used to manipulate lsass.exe running on a domain controller as well as for malicious modifications to functions exported from authentication-related system DLLs (such as cryptdll.dll and samsrv.dll). Monitor PAM configuration and module paths (ex: /etc/pam.d/) for changes. Use system-integrity tools such as AIDE and monitoring tools such as auditd to monitor PAM files. Monitor for suspicious additions to the /Library/Security/SecurityAgentPlugins directory. Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access). Monitor property changes in Group Policy that manage authentication mechanisms (i.e. Group Policy Modification). The Store passwords using reversible encryption configuration should be set to Disabled. Additionally, monitor and/or block suspicious command/script execution of -AllowReversiblePasswordEncryption $true, Set-ADUser and Set-ADAccountControl. Finally, monitor Fine-Grained Password Policies and regularly audit user accounts and group settings.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Module: Module Load, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, User Account: User Account Authentication, User Account: User Account Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1556.007", "name": "Modify Authentication Process: Hybrid Identity", "text": "Adversaries may patch, modify, or otherwise backdoor cloud authentication processes that are tied to on-premises user identities in order to bypass typical authentication mechanisms, access credentials, and enable persistent access to accounts. Many organizations maintain hybrid user and device identities that are shared between on-premises and cloud-based environments. These can be maintained in a number of ways. For example, Azure AD includes three options for synchronizing identities between Active Directory and Azure AD:  Password Hash Synchronization (PHS), in which a privileged on-premises account synchronizes user password hashes between Active Directory and Azure AD, allowing authentication to Azure AD to take place entirely in the cloud  Pass Through Authentication (PTA), in which Azure AD authentication attempts are forwarded to an on-premises PTA agent, which validates the credentials against Active Directory * Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS), in which a trust relationship is established between Active Directory and Azure AD AD FS can also be used with other SaaS and cloud platforms such as AWS and GCP, which will hand off the authentication process to AD FS and receive a token containing the hybrid users\u2019 identity and privileges. By modifying authentication processes tied to hybrid identities, an adversary may be able to establish persistent privileged access to cloud resources. For example, adversaries who compromise an on-premises server running a PTA agent may inject a malicious DLL into the `AzureADConnectAuthenticationAgentService` process that authorizes all attempts to authenticate to Azure AD, as well as records user credentials. In environments using AD FS, an adversary may edit the `Microsoft.IdentityServer.Servicehost` configuration file to load a malicious DLL that generates authentication tokens for any user with any set of claims, thereby bypassing multi-factor authentication and defined AD FS policies. In some cases, adversaries may be able to modify the hybrid identity authentication process from the cloud. For example, adversaries who compromise a Global Administrator account in an Azure AD tenant may be able to register a new PTA agent via the web console, similarly allowing them to harvest credentials and log into the Azure AD environment as any user.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/007", "tactics": "Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Modification, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Module: Module Load", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1556"}
{"ID": "T1556.006", "name": "Modify Authentication Process: Multi-Factor Authentication", "text": "Adversaries may disable or modify multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms to enable persistent access to compromised accounts. Once adversaries have gained access to a network by either compromising an account lacking MFA or by employing an MFA bypass method such as Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation, adversaries may leverage their access to modify or completely disable MFA defenses. This can be accomplished by abusing legitimate features, such as excluding users from Azure AD Conditional Access Policies, registering a new yet vulnerable/adversary-controlled MFA method, or by manually patching MFA programs and configuration files to bypass expected functionality. For example, modifying the Windows hosts file (`C:\\windows\\system32\\drivers\\etc\\hosts`) to redirect MFA calls to localhost instead of an MFA server may cause the MFA process to fail. If a \"fail open\" policy is in place, any otherwise successful authentication attempt may be granted access without enforcing MFA. Depending on the scope, goals, and privileges of the adversary, MFA defenses may be disabled for individual accounts or for all accounts tied to a larger group, such as all domain accounts in a victim's network environment.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1556/006", "tactics": "Credential Access, Defense Evasion, Persistence", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1556", "defenses bypassed": "Multi-Factor Authentication"}
{"ID": "T1137", "name": "Office Application Startup", "text": "Adversaries may leverage Microsoft Office-based applications for persistence between startups. Microsoft Office is a fairly common application suite on Windows-based operating systems within an enterprise network. There are multiple mechanisms that can be used with Office for persistence when an Office-based application is started; this can include the use of Office Template Macros and add-ins. A variety of features have been discovered in Outlook that can be abused to obtain persistence, such as Outlook rules, forms, and Home Page. These persistence mechanisms can work within Outlook or be used through Office 365.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior. If winword.exe is the parent process for suspicious processes and activity relating to other adversarial techniques, then it could indicate that the application was used maliciously. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output. SensePost, whose tool Ruler can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1137.006", "name": "Office Application Startup: Add-ins", "text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office add-ins to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Office add-ins can be used to add functionality to Office programs. There are different types of add-ins that can be used by the various Office products; including Word/Excel add-in Libraries (WLL/XLL), VBA add-ins, Office Component Object Model (COM) add-ins, automation add-ins, VBA Editor (VBE), Visual Studio Tools for Office (VSTO) add-ins, and Outlook add-ins. Add-ins can be used to obtain persistence because they can be set to execute code when an Office application starts.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/006", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Monitor and validate the Office trusted locations on the file system and audit the Registry entries relevant for enabling add-ins. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1137.001", "name": "Office Application Startup: Office Template Macros", "text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Office templates to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Microsoft Office contains templates that are part of common Office applications and are used to customize styles. The base templates within the application are used each time an application starts. Office Visual Basic for Applications (VBA) macros can be inserted into the base template and used to execute code when the respective Office application starts in order to obtain persistence. Examples for both Word and Excel have been discovered and published. By default, Word has a Normal.dotm template created that can be modified to include a malicious macro. Excel does not have a template file created by default, but one can be added that will automatically be loaded. Shared templates may also be stored and pulled from remote locations. Word Normal.dotm location:<br> C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Templates\\Normal.dotm Excel Personal.xlsb location:<br> C:\\Users\\&lt;username&gt;\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Excel\\XLSTART\\PERSONAL.XLSB Adversaries may also change the location of the base template to point to their own by hijacking the application's search order, e.g. Word 2016 will first look for Normal.dotm under C:\\Program Files (x86)\\Microsoft Office\\root\\Office16\\, or by modifying the GlobalDotName registry key. By modifying the GlobalDotName registry key an adversary can specify an arbitrary location, file name, and file extension to use for the template that will be loaded on application startup. To abuse GlobalDotName, adversaries may first need to register the template as a trusted document or place it in a trusted location. An adversary may need to enable macros to execute unrestricted depending on the system or enterprise security policy on use of macros.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/001", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Modification to base templates, like Normal.dotm, should also be investigated since the base templates should likely not contain VBA macros. Changes to the Office macro security settings should also be investigated.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1137.002", "name": "Office Application Startup: Office Test", "text": "Adversaries may abuse the Microsoft Office \"Office Test\" Registry key to obtain persistence on a compromised system. An Office Test Registry location exists that allows a user to specify an arbitrary DLL that will be executed every time an Office application is started. This Registry key is thought to be used by Microsoft to load DLLs for testing and debugging purposes while developing Office applications. This Registry key is not created by default during an Office installation. There exist user and global Registry keys for the Office Test feature:  HKEY_CURRENT_USER\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf  HKEYMACHINE\\Software\\Microsoft\\Office test\\Special\\Perf Adversaries may add this Registry key and specify a malicious DLL that will be executed whenever an Office application, such as Word or Excel, is started.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/002", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Monitor for the creation of the Office Test Registry key. Many Office-related persistence mechanisms require changes to the Registry and for binaries, files, or scripts to be written to disk or existing files modified to include malicious scripts. Collect events related to Registry key creation and modification for keys that could be used for Office-based persistence. Since v13.52, Autoruns can detect tasks set up using the Office Test Registry key. Consider monitoring Office processes for anomalous DLL loads.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Module: Module Load, Process: Process Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1137.003", "name": "Office Application Startup: Outlook Forms", "text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook forms to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook forms are used as templates for presentation and functionality in Outlook messages. Custom Outlook forms can be created that will execute code when a specifically crafted email is sent by an adversary utilizing the same custom Outlook form. Once malicious forms have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious forms will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/003", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output. SensePost, whose tool Ruler can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1137.004", "name": "Office Application Startup: Outlook Home Page", "text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook's Home Page feature to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook Home Page is a legacy feature used to customize the presentation of Outlook folders. This feature allows for an internal or external URL to be loaded and presented whenever a folder is opened. A malicious HTML page can be crafted that will execute code when loaded by Outlook Home Page. Once malicious home pages have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious Home Pages will execute when the right Outlook folder is loaded/reloaded.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/004", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output. SensePost, whose tool Ruler can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1137.005", "name": "Office Application Startup: Outlook Rules", "text": "Adversaries may abuse Microsoft Outlook rules to obtain persistence on a compromised system. Outlook rules allow a user to define automated behavior to manage email messages. A benign rule might, for example, automatically move an email to a particular folder in Outlook if it contains specific words from a specific sender. Malicious Outlook rules can be created that can trigger code execution when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to that user. Once malicious rules have been added to the user\u2019s mailbox, they will be loaded when Outlook is started. Malicious rules will execute when an adversary sends a specifically crafted email to the user.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1137/005", "tactics": "Persistence", "detection": "Microsoft has released a PowerShell script to safely gather mail forwarding rules and custom forms in your mail environment as well as steps to interpret the output. This PowerShell script is ineffective in gathering rules with modified `PRPRMSGRULEPROVIDER` properties caused by adversaries using a Microsoft Exchange Server Messaging API Editor (MAPI Editor), so only examination with the Exchange Administration tool MFCMapi can reveal these mail forwarding rules. SensePost, whose tool Ruler can be used to carry out malicious rules, forms, and Home Page attacks, has released a tool to detect Ruler usage. Collect process execution information including process IDs (PID) and parent process IDs (PPID) and look for abnormal chains of activity resulting from Office processes. Non-standard process execution trees may also indicate suspicious or malicious behavior.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1137"}
{"ID": "T1548", "name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism", "text": "Adversaries may circumvent mechanisms designed to control elevate privileges to gain higher-level permissions. Most modern systems contain native elevation control mechanisms that are intended to limit privileges that a user can perform on a machine. Authorization has to be granted to specific users in order to perform tasks that can be considered of higher risk. An adversary can perform several methods to take advantage of built-in control mechanisms in order to escalate privileges on a system.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor the file system for files that have the setuid or setgid bits set. Also look for any process API calls for behavior that may be indicative of Process Injection and unusual loaded DLLs through DLL Search Order Hijacking, which indicate attempts to gain access to higher privileged processes. On Linux, auditd can alert every time a user's actual ID and effective ID are different (this is what happens when you sudo). Consider monitoring for /usr/libexec/securityINPUT and LOG_OUTPUT directives in the /etc/sudoers file. There are many ways to perform UAC bypasses when a user is in the local administrator group on a system, so it may be difficult to target detection on all variations. Efforts should likely be placed on mitigation and collecting enough information on process launches and actions that could be performed before and after a UAC bypass is performed. Some UAC bypass methods rely on modifying specific, user-accessible Registry settings. Analysts should monitor Registry settings for unauthorized changes.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Metadata, User Account: User Account Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1548.005", "name": "Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Temporary Elevated Cloud Access", "text": "Adversaries may abuse permission configurations that allow them to gain temporarily elevated access to cloud resources. Many cloud environments allow administrators to grant user or service accounts permission to request just-in-time access to roles, impersonate other accounts, pass roles onto resources and services, or otherwise gain short-term access to a set of privileges that may be distinct from their own. Just-in-time access is a mechanism for granting additional roles to cloud accounts in a granular, temporary manner. This allows accounts to operate with only the permissions they need on a daily basis, and to request additional permissions as necessary. Sometimes just-in-time access requests are configured to require manual approval, while other times the desired permissions are automatically granted. Account impersonation allows user or service accounts to temporarily act with the permissions of another account. For example, in GCP users with the `iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator` role can create temporary access tokens or sign arbitrary payloads with the permissions of a service account. In Exchange Online, the `ApplicationImpersonation` role allows a service account to use the permissions associated with specified user accounts. Many cloud environments also include mechanisms for users to pass roles to resources that allow them to perform tasks and authenticate to other services. While the user that creates the resource does not directly assume the role they pass to it, they may still be able to take advantage of the role's access -- for example, by configuring the resource to perform certain actions with the permissions it has been granted. In AWS, users with the `PassRole` permission can allow a service they create to assume a given role, while in GCP, users with the `iam.serviceAccountUser` role can attach a service account to a resource. While users require specific role assignments in order to use any of these features, cloud administrators may misconfigure permissions. This could result in escalation paths that allow adversaries to gain access to resources beyond what was originally intended. Note: this technique is distinct from Additional Cloud Roles, which involves assigning permanent roles to accounts rather than abusing existing permissions structures to gain temporarily elevated access to resources. However, adversaries that compromise a sufficiently privileged account may grant another account they control Additional Cloud Roles that would allow them to also abuse these features. This may also allow for greater stealth than would be had by directly using the highly privileged account, especially when logs do not clarify when role impersonation is taking place.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1548/005", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, IaaS, Office 365", "data sources": "User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1548"}
{"ID": "T1484", "name": "Domain Policy Modification", "text": "Adversaries may modify the configuration settings of a domain to evade defenses and/or escalate privileges in domain environments. Domains provide a centralized means of managing how computer resources (ex: computers, user accounts) can act, and interact with each other, on a network. The policy of the domain also includes configuration settings that may apply between domains in a multi-domain/forest environment. Modifications to domain settings may include altering domain Group Policy Objects (GPOs) or changing trust settings for domains, including federation trusts. With sufficient permissions, adversaries can modify domain policy settings. Since domain configuration settings control many of the interactions within the Active Directory (AD) environment, there are a great number of potential attacks that can stem from this abuse. Examples of such abuse include modifying GPOs to push a malicious Scheduled Task to computers throughout the domain environment or modifying domain trusts to include an adversary controlled domain where they can control access tokens that will subsequently be accepted by victim domain resources. Adversaries can also change configuration settings within the AD environment to implement a Rogue Domain Controller. Adversaries may temporarily modify domain policy, carry out a malicious action(s), and then revert the change to remove suspicious indicators.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "It may be possible to detect domain policy modifications using Windows event logs. Group policy modifications, for example, may be logged under a variety of Windows event IDs for modifying, creating, undeleting, moving, and deleting directory service objects (Event ID 5136, 5137, 5138, 5139, 5141 respectively). Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication. This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details. Consider monitoring for commands/cmdlets and command-line arguments that may be leveraged to modify domain policy settings. Some domain policy modifications, such as changes to federation settings, are likely to be rare.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Windows", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Deletion, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "File system access controls, System access controls"}
{"ID": "T1484.002", "name": "Domain Policy Modification: Domain Trust Modification", "text": "Adversaries may add new domain trusts or modify the properties of existing domain trusts to evade defenses and/or elevate privileges. Domain trust details, such as whether or not a domain is federated, allow authentication and authorization properties to apply between domains for the purpose of accessing shared resources. These trust objects may include accounts, credentials, and other authentication material applied to servers, tokens, and domains. Manipulating the domain trusts may allow an adversary to escalate privileges and/or evade defenses by modifying settings to add objects which they control. For example, this may be used to forge SAML Tokens, without the need to compromise the signing certificate to forge new credentials. Instead, an adversary can manipulate domain trusts to add their own signing certificate. An adversary may also convert a domain to a federated domain, which may enable malicious trust modifications such as altering the claim issuance rules to log in any valid set of credentials as a specified user.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1484/002", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Privilege Escalation", "detection": "Monitor for modifications to domain trust settings, such as when a user or application modifies the federation settings on the domain or updates domain authentication from Managed to Federated via ActionTypes Set federation settings on domain and Set domain authentication. This may also include monitoring for Event ID 307 which can be correlated to relevant Event ID 510 with the same Instance ID for change details. Monitor for PowerShell commands such as: Update-MSOLFederatedDomain \u2013DomainName: \"Federated Domain Name\", or Update-MSOLFederatedDomain \u2013DomainName: \"Federated Domain Name\" \u2013supportmultipledomain.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Windows", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Creation, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Command: Command Execution", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1484"}
{"ID": "T1211", "name": "Exploitation for Defense Evasion", "text": "Adversaries may exploit a system or application vulnerability to bypass security features. Exploitation of a vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Vulnerabilities may exist in defensive security software that can be used to disable or circumvent them. Adversaries may have prior knowledge through reconnaissance that security software exists within an environment or they may perform checks during or shortly after the system is compromised for Security Software Discovery. The security software will likely be targeted directly for exploitation. There are examples of antivirus software being targeted by persistent threat groups to avoid detection. There have also been examples of vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure of SaaS applications that may bypass defense boundaries , evade security logs , or deploy hidden infrastructure.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1211", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Exploitation for defense evasion may happen shortly after the system has been compromised to prevent detection during later actions for for additional tools that may be brought in and used. Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. This could include suspicious files written to disk, evidence of Process Injection for attempts to hide execution or evidence of Discovery.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "Anti-virus, System access controls"}
{"ID": "T1564", "name": "Hide Artifacts", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to hide artifacts associated with their behaviors to evade detection. Operating systems may have features to hide various artifacts, such as important system files and administrative task execution, to avoid disrupting user work environments and prevent users from changing files or features on the system. Adversaries may abuse these features to hide artifacts such as files, directories, user accounts, or other system activity to evade detection. Adversaries may also attempt to hide artifacts associated with malicious behavior by creating computing regions that are isolated from common security instrumentation, such as through the use of virtualization technology.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor files, processes, and command-line arguments for actions indicative of hidden artifacts. Monitor event and authentication logs for records of hidden artifacts being used. Monitor the file system and shell commands for hidden attribute usage.", "platforms": "Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Firmware: Firmware Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Script: Script Execution, Service: Service Creation, User Account: User Account Creation, User Account: User Account Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1564.008", "name": "Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules", "text": "Adversaries may use email rules to hide inbound emails in a compromised user's mailbox. Many email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including moving emails to other folders, marking emails as read, or deleting emails. Rules may be created or modified within email clients or through external features such as the New-InboxRule or Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets on Windows systems. Adversaries may utilize email rules within a compromised user's mailbox to delete and/or move emails to less noticeable folders. Adversaries may do this to hide security alerts, C2 communication, or responses to Internal Spearphishing emails sent from the compromised account. Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) may be able to create rules to automatically move or delete emails. These rules can be abused to impair/delay detection had the email content been immediately seen by a user or defender. Malicious rules commonly filter out emails based on key words (such as malware, suspicious, phish, and hack) found in message bodies and subject lines. In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to automatically modify or delete all emails related to specific topics (such as internal security incident notifications).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1564/008", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor email clients and applications for suspicious activity, such as missing messages or abnormal configuration and/or log entries. On Windows systems, monitor for creation of suspicious inbox rules through the use of the New-InboxRule and Set-InboxRule PowerShell cmdlets. On MacOS systems, monitor for modifications to the RulesActiveState.plist, SyncedRules.plist, UnsyncedRules.plist, and MessageRules.plist files.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1564"}
{"ID": "T1562", "name": "Impair Defenses", "text": "Adversaries may maliciously modify components of a victim environment in order to hinder or disable defensive mechanisms. This not only involves impairing preventative defenses, such as firewalls and anti-virus, but also detection capabilities that defenders can use to audit activity and identify malicious behavior. This may also span both native defenses as well as supplemental capabilities installed by users and administrators. Adversaries may also impair routine operations that contribute to defensive hygiene, such as blocking users from logging out of a computer or stopping it from being shut down. These restrictions can further enable malicious operations as well as the continued propagation of incidents. Adversaries could also target event aggregation and analysis mechanisms, or otherwise disrupt these procedures by altering other system components.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools or logging services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Lack of log events may be suspicious. Monitor environment variables and APIs that can be leveraged to disable security measures.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable, Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification, Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Firewall: Firewall Disable, Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Modification, Process: Process Termination, Script: Script Execution, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, User Account: User Account Modification, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "Anti-virus, Digital Certificate Validation, File monitoring, Firewall, Host forensic analysis, Host intrusion prevention systems, Log analysis, Signature-based detection"}
{"ID": "T1562.007", "name": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Firewall", "text": "Adversaries may disable or modify a firewall within a cloud environment to bypass controls that limit access to cloud resources. Cloud firewalls are separate from system firewalls that are described in Disable or Modify System Firewall. Cloud environments typically utilize restrictive security groups and firewall rules that only allow network activity from trusted IP addresses via expected ports and protocols. An adversary may introduce new firewall rules or policies to allow access into a victim cloud environment. For example, an adversary may use a script or utility that creates new ingress rules in existing security groups to allow any TCP/IP connectivity, or remove networking limitations to support traffic associated with malicious activity (such as cryptomining). Modifying or disabling a cloud firewall may enable adversary C2 communications, lateral movement, and/or data exfiltration that would otherwise not be allowed.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/007", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor cloud logs for modification or creation of new security groups or firewall rules.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Firewall: Firewall Disable, Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1562"}
{"ID": "T1562.008", "name": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Cloud Logs", "text": "An adversary may disable or modify cloud logging capabilities and integrations to limit what data is collected on their activities and avoid detection. Cloud environments allow for collection and analysis of audit and application logs that provide insight into what activities a user does within the environment. If an adversary has sufficient permissions, they can disable or modify logging to avoid detection of their activities. For example, in AWS an adversary may disable CloudWatch/CloudTrail integrations prior to conducting further malicious activity. They may alternatively tamper with logging functionality \u2013 for example, by removing any associated SNS topics, disabling multi-region logging, or disabling settings that validate and/or encrypt log files. In Office 365, an adversary may disable logging on mail collection activities for specific users by using the `Set-MailboxAuditBypassAssociation` cmdlet, by disabling M365 Advanced Auditing for the user, or by downgrading the user\u2019s license from an Enterprise E5 to an Enterprise E3 license.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/008", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor logs for API calls to disable logging. In AWS, monitor for: StopLogging and DeleteTrail. In GCP, monitor for: google.logging.v2.ConfigServiceV2.UpdateSink. In Azure, monitor for az monitor diagnostic-settings delete. Additionally, a sudden loss of a log source may indicate that it has been disabled.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Disable, Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1562"}
{"ID": "T1562.001", "name": "Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools", "text": "Adversaries may modify and/or disable security tools to avoid possible detection of their malware/tools and activities. This may take many forms, such as killing security software processes or services, modifying / deleting Registry keys or configuration files so that tools do not operate properly, or other methods to interfere with security tools scanning or reporting information. Adversaries may also disable updates to prevent the latest security patches from reaching tools on victim systems. Adversaries may also tamper with artifacts deployed and utilized by security tools. Security tools may make dynamic changes to system components in order to maintain visibility into specific events. For example, security products may load their own modules and/or modify those loaded by processes to facilitate data collection. Similar to Indicator Blocking, adversaries may unhook or otherwise modify these features added by tools (especially those that exist in userland or are otherwise potentially accessible to adversaries) to avoid detection. Adversaries may also focus on specific applications such as Sysmon. For example, the \u201cStart\u201d and \u201cEnable\u201d values in HKEYMACHINE\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\WMI\\Autologger\\EventLog-Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon-Operational may be modified to tamper with and potentially disable Sysmon logging. On network devices, adversaries may attempt to skip digital signature verification checks by altering startup configuration files and effectively disabling firmware verification that typically occurs at boot. In cloud environments, tools disabled by adversaries may include cloud monitoring agents that report back to services such as AWS CloudWatch or Google Cloud Monitor. Furthermore, although defensive tools may have anti-tampering mechanisms, adversaries may abuse tools such as legitimate rootkit removal kits to impair and/or disable these tools. For example, adversaries have used tools such as GMER to find and shut down hidden processes and antivirus software on infected systems. Additionally, adversaries may exploit legitimate drivers from anti-virus software to gain access to kernel space (i.e. Exploitation for Privilege Escalation), which may lead to bypassing anti-tampering features.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1562/001", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor processes and command-line arguments to see if security tools/services are killed or stop running. Monitor Registry edits for modifications to services and startup programs that correspond to security tools. Monitoring for changes to other known features used by deployed security tools may also expose malicious activity. Lack of expected log events may be suspicious.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Driver: Driver Load, Process: Process Creation, Process: Process Termination, Sensor Health: Host Status, Service: Service Metadata, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1562", "defenses bypassed": "Anti-virus, File monitoring, Host intrusion prevention systems, Log analysis, Signature-based detection"}
{"ID": "T1656", "name": "Impersonation", "text": "Adversaries may impersonate a trusted person or organization in order to persuade and trick a target into performing some action on their behalf. For example, adversaries may communicate with victims (via Phishing for Information, Phishing, or Internal Spearphishing) while impersonating a known sender such as an executive, colleague, or third-party vendor. Established trust can then be leveraged to accomplish an adversary\u2019s ultimate goals, possibly against multiple victims. In many cases of business email compromise or email fraud campaigns, adversaries use impersonation to defraud victims -- deceiving them into sending money or divulging information that ultimately enables Financial Theft. Adversaries will often also use social engineering techniques such as manipulative and persuasive language in email subject lines and body text such as `payment`, `request`, or `urgent` to push the victim to act quickly before malicious activity is detected. These campaigns are often specifically targeted against people who, due to job roles and/or accesses, can carry out the adversary\u2019s goal. Impersonation is typically preceded by reconnaissance techniques such as Gather Victim Identity Information and Gather Victim Org Information as well as acquiring infrastructure such as email domains (i.e. Domains) to substantiate their false identity. There is the potential for multiple victims in campaigns involving impersonation. For example, an adversary may Compromise Accounts targeting one organization which can then be used to support impersonation against other entities.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1656", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1070", "name": "Indicator Removal", "text": "Adversaries may delete or modify artifacts generated within systems to remove evidence of their presence or hinder defenses. Various artifacts may be created by an adversary or something that can be attributed to an adversary\u2019s actions. Typically these artifacts are used as defensive indicators related to monitored events, such as strings from downloaded files, logs that are generated from user actions, and other data analyzed by defenders. Location, format, and type of artifact (such as command or login history) are often specific to each platform. Removal of these indicators may interfere with event collection, reporting, or other processes used to detect intrusion activity. This may compromise the integrity of security solutions by causing notable events to go unreported. This activity may also impede forensic analysis and incident response, due to lack of sufficient data to determine what occurred.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "File system monitoring may be used to detect improper deletion or modification of indicator files. Events not stored on the file system may require different detection mechanisms.", "platforms": "Containers, Google Workspace, Linux, Network, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Metadata, File: File Modification, Firewall: Firewall Rule Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation, Scheduled Job: Scheduled Job Modification, User Account: User Account Authentication, User Account: User Account Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "Anti-virus, Host intrusion prevention systems, Log analysis"}
{"ID": "T1070.008", "name": "Indicator Removal: Clear Mailbox Data", "text": "Adversaries may modify mail and mail application data to remove evidence of their activity. Email applications allow users and other programs to export and delete mailbox data via command line tools or use of APIs. Mail application data can be emails, email metadata, or logs generated by the application or operating system, such as export requests. Adversaries may manipulate emails and mailbox data to remove logs, artifacts, and metadata, such as evidence of Phishing/Internal Spearphishing, Email Collection, Mail Protocols for command and control, or email-based exfiltration such as Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol. For example, to remove evidence on Exchange servers adversaries have used the ExchangePowerShell PowerShell module, including Remove-MailboxExportRequest to remove evidence of mailbox exports. On Linux and macOS, adversaries may also delete emails through a command line utility called mail or use AppleScript to interact with APIs on macOS. Adversaries may also remove emails and metadata/headers indicative of spam or suspicious activity (for example, through the use of organization-wide transport rules) to reduce the likelihood of malicious emails being detected by security products.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1070/008", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1070"}
{"ID": "T1578", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure", "text": "An adversary may attempt to modify a cloud account's compute service infrastructure to evade defenses. A modification to the compute service infrastructure can include the creation, deletion, or modification of one or more components such as compute instances, virtual machines, and snapshots. Permissions gained from the modification of infrastructure components may bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing infrastructure. Modifying infrastructure components may also allow an adversary to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud compute infrastructure components. Monitor for suspicious sequences of events, such as the creation of multiple snapshots within a short period of time or the mount of a snapshot to a new instance by a new or unexpected user. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Metadata, Instance: Instance Creation, Instance: Instance Deletion, Instance: Instance Metadata, Instance: Instance Modification, Instance: Instance Start, Instance: Instance Stop, Snapshot: Snapshot Creation, Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion, Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata, Snapshot: Snapshot Modification, Volume: Volume Creation, Volume: Volume Deletion, Volume: Volume Metadata, Volume: Volume Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1578.002", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Cloud Instance", "text": "An adversary may create a new instance or virtual machine (VM) within the compute service of a cloud account to evade defenses. Creating a new instance may allow an adversary to bypass firewall rules and permissions that exist on instances currently residing within an account. An adversary may Create Snapshot of one or more volumes in an account, create a new instance, mount the snapshots, and then apply a less restrictive security policy to collect Data from Local System or for Remote Data Staging. Creating a new instance may also allow an adversary to carry out malicious activity within an environment without affecting the execution of current running instances.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/002", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "The creation of a new instance or VM is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, the creation of an instance by a new user account or the unexpected creation of one or more snapshots followed by the creation of an instance may indicate suspicious activity. In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of an instance in the RunInstances event, and in Azure the creation of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs. Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances create to create a VM.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Instance: Instance Creation, Instance: Instance Metadata", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1578"}
{"ID": "T1578.001", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Create Snapshot", "text": "An adversary may create a snapshot or data backup within a cloud account to evade defenses. A snapshot is a point-in-time copy of an existing cloud compute component such as a virtual machine (VM), virtual hard drive, or volume. An adversary may leverage permissions to create a snapshot in order to bypass restrictions that prevent access to existing compute service infrastructure, unlike in Revert Cloud Instance where an adversary may revert to a snapshot to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance, mount one or more created snapshots to that instance, and then apply a policy that allows the adversary access to the created instance, such as a firewall policy that allows them inbound and outbound SSH access.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/001", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "The creation of a snapshot is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities such as the creation of one or more snapshots and the restoration of these snapshots by a new user account. In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the creation of snapshots and all API calls for AWS Backup as events. Using the information collected by CloudTrail, you can determine the request that was made, the IP address from which the request was made, which user made the request, when it was made, and additional details.. In Azure, the creation of a snapshot may be captured in Azure activity logs. Backup restoration events can also be detected through Azure Monitor Log Data by creating a custom alert for completed restore jobs. Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of the gcloud compute instances create command to create a new VM disk from a snapshot. It is also possible to detect the usage of the GCP API with the \"sourceSnapshot\": parameter pointed to \"global/snapshots/[BOOTNAME].", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Snapshot: Snapshot Creation, Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1578"}
{"ID": "T1578.003", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Delete Cloud Instance", "text": "An adversary may delete a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in an attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. Deleting an instance or virtual machine can remove valuable forensic artifacts and other evidence of suspicious behavior if the instance is not recoverable. An adversary may also Create Cloud Instance and later terminate the instance after achieving their objectives.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/003", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "The deletion of a new instance or virtual machine is a common part of operations within many cloud environments. Events should then not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities. For example, detecting a sequence of events such as the creation of an instance, mounting of a snapshot to that instance, and deletion of that instance by a new user account may indicate suspicious activity. In AWS, CloudTrail logs capture the deletion of an instance in the TerminateInstances event, and in Azure the deletion of a VM may be captured in Azure activity logs. Google's Admin Activity audit logs within their Cloud Audit logs can be used to detect the usage of gcloud compute instances delete to delete a VM.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Instance: Instance Deletion, Instance: Instance Metadata", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1578"}
{"ID": "T1578.005", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Modify Cloud Compute Configurations", "text": "Adversaries may modify settings that directly affect the size, locations, and resources available to cloud compute infrastructure in order to evade defenses. These settings may include service quotas, subscription associations, tenant-wide policies, or other configurations that impact available compute. Such modifications may allow adversaries to abuse the victim\u2019s compute resources to achieve their goals, potentially without affecting the execution of running instances and/or revealing their activities to the victim. For example, cloud providers often limit customer usage of compute resources via quotas. Customers may request adjustments to these quotas to support increased computing needs, though these adjustments may require approval from the cloud provider. Adversaries who compromise a cloud environment may similarly request quota adjustments in order to support their activities, such as enabling additional Resource Hijacking without raising suspicion by using up a victim\u2019s entire quota. Adversaries may also increase allowed resource usage by modifying any tenant-wide policies that limit the sizes of deployed virtual machines. Adversaries may also modify settings that affect where cloud resources can be deployed, such as enabling Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions. In Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources, or engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim\u2019s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/005", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Modification", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1578"}
{"ID": "T1578.004", "name": "Modify Cloud Compute Infrastructure: Revert Cloud Instance", "text": "An adversary may revert changes made to a cloud instance after they have performed malicious activities in attempt to evade detection and remove evidence of their presence. In highly virtualized environments, such as cloud-based infrastructure, this may be accomplished by restoring virtual machine (VM) or data storage snapshots through the cloud management dashboard or cloud APIs. Another variation of this technique is to utilize temporary storage attached to the compute instance. Most cloud providers provide various types of storage including persistent, local, and/or ephemeral, with the ephemeral types often reset upon stop/restart of the VM.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1578/004", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Establish centralized logging of instance activity, which can be used to monitor and review system events even after reverting to a snapshot, rolling back changes, or changing persistence/type of storage. Monitor specifically for events related to snapshots and rollbacks and VM configuration changes, that are occurring outside of normal activity. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Instance: Instance Metadata, Instance: Instance Modification, Instance: Instance Start, Instance: Instance Stop", "is sub-technique": true}
{"ID": "T1535", "name": "Unused/Unsupported Cloud Regions", "text": "Adversaries may create cloud instances in unused geographic service regions in order to evade detection. Access is usually obtained through compromising accounts used to manage cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers often provide infrastructure throughout the world in order to improve performance, provide redundancy, and allow customers to meet compliance requirements. Oftentimes, a customer will only use a subset of the available regions and may not actively monitor other regions. If an adversary creates resources in an unused region, they may be able to operate undetected. A variation on this behavior takes advantage of differences in functionality across cloud regions. An adversary could utilize regions which do not support advanced detection services in order to avoid detection of their activity. An example of adversary use of unused AWS regions is to mine cryptocurrency through Resource Hijacking, which can cost organizations substantial amounts of money over time depending on the processing power used.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1535", "tactics": "Defense Evasion", "detection": "Monitor system logs to review activities occurring across all cloud environments and regions. Configure alerting to notify of activity in normally unused regions or if the number of instances active in a region goes above a certain threshold.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Instance: Instance Creation, Instance: Instance Metadata", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1550", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material", "text": "Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls. Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process. Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system\u2014either in memory or on disk\u2014it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Lateral Movement", "detection": "Configure robust, consistent account activity audit policies across the enterprise and with externally accessible services. Look for suspicious account behavior across systems that share accounts, either user, admin, or service accounts. Examples: one account logged into multiple systems simultaneously; multiple accounts logged into the same machine simultaneously; accounts logged in at odd times or outside of business hours. Activity may be from interactive login sessions or process ownership from accounts being used to execute binaries on a remote system as a particular account. Correlate other security systems with login information (e.g., a user has an active login session but has not entered the building or does not have VPN access).", "platforms": "Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request, Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication, Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": false, "defenses bypassed": "System Access Controls"}
{"ID": "T1550.001", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Application Access Token", "text": "Adversaries may use stolen application access tokens to bypass the typical authentication process and access restricted accounts, information, or services on remote systems. These tokens are typically stolen from users or services and used in lieu of login credentials. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used to access resources in cloud, container-based applications, and software-as-a-service (SaaS). OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. These frameworks are used collaboratively to verify the user and determine what actions the user is allowed to perform. Once identity is established, the token allows actions to be authorized, without passing the actual credentials of the user. Therefore, compromise of the token can grant the adversary access to resources of other sites through a malicious application. For example, with a cloud-based email service, once an OAuth access token is granted to a malicious application, it can potentially gain long-term access to features of the user account if a \"refresh\" token enabling background access is awarded. With an OAuth access token an adversary can use the user-granted REST API to perform functions such as email searching and contact enumeration. Compromised access tokens may be used as an initial step in compromising other services. For example, if a token grants access to a victim\u2019s primary email, the adversary may be able to extend access to all other services which the target subscribes by triggering forgotten password routines. In AWS and GCP environments, adversaries can trigger a request for a short-lived access token with the privileges of another user account. The adversary can then use this token to request data or perform actions the original account could not. If permissions for this feature are misconfigured \u2013 for example, by allowing all users to request a token for a particular account - an adversary may be able to gain initial access to a Cloud Account or escalate their privileges. Direct API access through a token negates the effectiveness of a second authentication factor and may be immune to intuitive countermeasures like changing passwords. For example, in AWS environments, an adversary who compromises a user\u2019s AWS API credentials may be able to use the `sts:GetFederationToken` API call to create a federated user session, which will have the same permissions as the original user but may persist even if the original user credentials are deactivated. Additionally, access abuse over an API channel can be difficult to detect even from the service provider end, as the access can still align well with a legitimate workflow.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Lateral Movement", "detection": "Monitor access token activity for abnormal use and permissions granted to unusual or suspicious applications and APIs. Additionally, administrators should review logs for calls to the AWS Security Token Service (STS) and usage of GCP service accounts in order to identify anomalous actions.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1550", "defenses bypassed": "System Access Controls"}
{"ID": "T1550.004", "name": "Use Alternate Authentication Material: Web Session Cookie", "text": "Adversaries can use stolen session cookies to authenticate to web applications and services. This technique bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols since the session is already authenticated. Authentication cookies are commonly used in web applications, including cloud-based services, after a user has authenticated to the service so credentials are not passed and re-authentication does not need to occur as frequently. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. After the cookie is obtained through Steal Web Session Cookie or Web Cookies, the adversary may then import the cookie into a browser they control and is then able to use the site or application as the user for as long as the session cookie is active. Once logged into the site, an adversary can access sensitive information, read email, or perform actions that the victim account has permissions to perform. There have been examples of malware targeting session cookies to bypass multi-factor authentication systems.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/004", "tactics": "Defense Evasion, Lateral Movement", "detection": "Monitor for anomalous access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1550", "defenses bypassed": "System Access Controls"}
{"ID": "T1110", "name": "Brute Force", "text": "Adversaries may use brute force techniques to gain access to accounts when passwords are unknown or when password hashes are obtained. Without knowledge of the password for an account or set of accounts, an adversary may systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. Brute forcing passwords can take place via interaction with a service that will check the validity of those credentials or offline against previously acquired credential data, such as password hashes. Brute forcing credentials may take place at various points during a breach. For example, adversaries may attempt to brute force access to Valid Accounts within a victim environment leveraging knowledge gathered from other post-compromise behaviors such as OS Credential Dumping, Account Discovery, or Password Policy Discovery. Adversaries may also combine brute forcing activity with behaviors such as External Remote Services as part of Initial Access.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials. Also monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1110.004", "name": "Brute Force: Credential Stuffing", "text": "Adversaries may use credentials obtained from breach dumps of unrelated accounts to gain access to target accounts through credential overlap. Occasionally, large numbers of username and password pairs are dumped online when a website or service is compromised and the user account credentials accessed. The information may be useful to an adversary attempting to compromise accounts by taking advantage of the tendency for users to use the same passwords across personal and business accounts. Credential stuffing is a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when stuffing credentials. Commonly targeted services include the following:  SSH (22/TCP)  Telnet (23/TCP)  FTP (21/TCP)  NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)  LDAP (389/TCP)  Kerberos (88/TCP)  RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)  HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)  MSSQL (1433/TCP)  Oracle (1521/TCP)  MySQL (3306/TCP)  VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/004", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1110"}
{"ID": "T1110.002", "name": "Brute Force: Password Cracking", "text": "Adversaries may use password cracking to attempt to recover usable credentials, such as plaintext passwords, when credential material such as password hashes are obtained. OS Credential Dumping can be used to obtain password hashes, this may only get an adversary so far when Pass the Hash is not an option. Further, adversaries may leverage Data from Configuration Repository in order to obtain hashed credentials for network devices. Techniques to systematically guess the passwords used to compute hashes are available, or the adversary may use a pre-computed rainbow table to crack hashes. Cracking hashes is usually done on adversary-controlled systems outside of the target network. The resulting plaintext password resulting from a successfully cracked hash may be used to log into systems, resources, and services in which the account has access.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/002", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "It is difficult to detect when hashes are cracked, since this is generally done outside the scope of the target network. Consider focusing efforts on detecting other adversary behavior used to acquire credential materials, such as OS Credential Dumping or Kerberoasting.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Linux, Network, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1110"}
{"ID": "T1110.001", "name": "Brute Force: Password Guessing", "text": "Adversaries with no prior knowledge of legitimate credentials within the system or environment may guess passwords to attempt access to accounts. Without knowledge of the password for an account, an adversary may opt to systematically guess the password using a repetitive or iterative mechanism. An adversary may guess login credentials without prior knowledge of system or environment passwords during an operation by using a list of common passwords. Password guessing may or may not take into account the target's policies on password complexity or use policies that may lock accounts out after a number of failed attempts. Guessing passwords can be a risky option because it could cause numerous authentication failures and account lockouts, depending on the organization's login failure policies. Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when guessing passwords. Commonly targeted services include the following:  SSH (22/TCP)  Telnet (23/TCP)  FTP (21/TCP)  NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)  LDAP (389/TCP)  Kerberos (88/TCP)  RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)  HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)  MSSQL (1433/TCP)  Oracle (1521/TCP)  MySQL (3306/TCP)  VNC (5900/TCP) * SNMP (161/UDP and 162/TCP/UDP) In addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365.. Further, adversaries may abuse network device interfaces (such as `wlanAPI`) to brute force accessible wifi-router(s) via wireless authentication protocols. In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/001", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. If authentication failures are high, then there may be a brute force attempt to gain access to a system using legitimate credentials.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1110"}
{"ID": "T1110.003", "name": "Brute Force: Password Spraying", "text": "Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:  SSH (22/TCP)  Telnet (23/TCP)  FTP (21/TCP)  NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)  LDAP (389/TCP)  Kerberos (88/TCP)  RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)  HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)  MSSQL (1433/TCP)  Oracle (1521/TCP)  MySQL (3306/TCP)  VNC (5900/TCP) In addition to management services, adversaries may \"target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols,\" as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365. In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows \"logon failure\" event ID 4625.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1110/003", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor authentication logs for system and application login failures of Valid Accounts. Specifically, monitor for many failed authentication attempts across various accounts that may result from password spraying attempts. Consider the following event IDs:  Domain Controllers: \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4625.  Domain Controllers: \"Audit Kerberos Authentication Service\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4771. * All systems: \"Audit Logon\" (Success & Failure) for event ID 4648.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1110"}
{"ID": "T1555", "name": "Credentials from Password Stores", "text": "Adversaries may search for common password storage locations to obtain user credentials. Passwords are stored in several places on a system, depending on the operating system or application holding the credentials. There are also specific applications and services that store passwords to make them easier for users to manage and maintain, such as password managers and cloud secrets vaults. Once credentials are obtained, they can be used to perform lateral movement and access restricted information.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor system calls, file read events, and processes for suspicious activity that could indicate searching for a password or other activity related to performing keyword searches (e.g. password, pwd, login, store, secure, credentials, etc.) in process memory for credentials. File read events should be monitored surrounding known password storage applications.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1555.006", "name": "Credentials from Password Stores: Cloud Secrets Management Stores", "text": "Adversaries may acquire credentials from cloud-native secret management solutions such as AWS Secrets Manager, GCP Secret Manager, Azure Key Vault, and Terraform Vault. Secrets managers support the secure centralized management of passwords, API keys, and other credential material. Where secrets managers are in use, cloud services can dynamically acquire credentials via API requests rather than accessing secrets insecurely stored in plain text files or environment variables. If an adversary is able to gain sufficient privileges in a cloud environment \u2013 for example, by obtaining the credentials of high-privileged Cloud Accounts or compromising a service that has permission to retrieve secrets \u2013 they may be able to request secrets from the secrets manager. This can be accomplished via commands such as `get-secret-value` in AWS, `gcloud secrets describe` in GCP, and `az key vault secret show` in Azure. Note: this technique is distinct from Cloud Instance Metadata API in that the credentials are being directly requested from the cloud secrets manager, rather than through the medium of the instance metadata API.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1555/006", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1555"}
{"ID": "T1212", "name": "Exploitation for Credential Access", "text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities in an attempt to collect credentials. Exploitation of a software vulnerability occurs when an adversary takes advantage of a programming error in a program, service, or within the operating system software or kernel itself to execute adversary-controlled code. Credentialing and authentication mechanisms may be targeted for exploitation by adversaries as a means to gain access to useful credentials or circumvent the process to gain authenticated access to systems. One example of this is `MS14-068`, which targets Kerberos and can be used to forge Kerberos tickets using domain user permissions. Another example of this is replay attacks, in which the adversary intercepts data packets sent between parties and then later replays these packets. If services don't properly validate authentication requests, these replayed packets may allow an adversary to impersonate one of the parties and gain unauthorized access or privileges. Such exploitation has been demonstrated in cloud environments as well. For example, adversaries have exploited vulnerabilities in public cloud infrastructure that allowed for unintended authentication token creation and renewal. Exploitation for credential access may also result in Privilege Escalation depending on the process targeted or credentials obtained.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1212", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Detecting software exploitation may be difficult depending on the tools available. Software exploits may not always succeed or may cause the exploited process to become unstable or crash. Also look for behavior on the system that might indicate successful compromise, such as abnormal behavior of processes. Credential resources obtained through exploitation may be detectable in use if they are not normally used or seen.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Process: Process Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1606", "name": "Forge Web Credentials", "text": "Adversaries may forge credential materials that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies, tokens, or other materials to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these credential materials in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie, Steal Application Access Token, and other similar behaviors in that the credentials are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. The generation of web credentials often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values. Adversaries may also forge tokens by taking advantage of features such as the `AssumeRole` and `GetFederationToken` APIs in AWS, which allow users to request temporary security credentials (i.e., Temporary Elevated Cloud Access), or the `zmprov gdpak` command in Zimbra, which generates a pre-authentication key that can be used to generate tokens for any user in the domain. Once forged, adversaries may use these web credentials to access resources (ex: Use Alternate Authentication Material), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Web Credential: Web Credential Creation, Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1606.002", "name": "Forge Web Credentials: SAML Tokens", "text": "An adversary may forge SAML tokens with any permissions claims and lifetimes if they possess a valid SAML token-signing certificate. The default lifetime of a SAML token is one hour, but the validity period can be specified in the NotOnOrAfter value of the conditions ... element in a token. This value can be changed using the AccessTokenLifetime in a LifetimeTokenPolicy. Forged SAML tokens enable adversaries to authenticate across services that use SAML 2.0 as an SSO (single sign-on) mechanism. An adversary may utilize Private Keys to compromise an organization's token-signing certificate to create forged SAML tokens. If the adversary has sufficient permissions to establish a new federation trust with their own Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server, they may instead generate their own trusted token-signing certificate. This differs from Steal Application Access Token and other similar behaviors in that the tokens are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. An adversary may gain administrative Azure AD privileges if a SAML token is forged which claims to represent a highly privileged account. This may lead to Use Alternate Authentication Material, which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/002", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "This technique may be difficult to detect as SAML tokens are signed by a trusted certificate. The forging process may not be detectable since it is likely to happen outside of a defender's visibility, but subsequent usage of the forged token may be seen. Monitor for anomalous logins using SAML tokens created by a compromised or adversary generated token-signing certificate. These logins may occur on any on-premises resources as well as from any cloud environment that trusts the certificate. Search for logins to service providers using SAML SSO which do not have corresponding 4769, 1200, and 1202 events in the Domain. Consider modifying SAML responses to include custom elements for each service provider. Monitor these custom elements in service provider access logs to detect any anomalous requests.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS, Windows", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication, Web Credential: Web Credential Creation, Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1606"}
{"ID": "T1606.001", "name": "Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies", "text": "Adversaries may forge web cookies that can be used to gain access to web applications or Internet services. Web applications and services (hosted in cloud SaaS environments or on-premise servers) often use session cookies to authenticate and authorize user access. Adversaries may generate these cookies in order to gain access to web resources. This differs from Steal Web Session Cookie and other similar behaviors in that the cookies are new and forged by the adversary, rather than stolen or intercepted from legitimate users. Most common web applications have standardized and documented cookie values that can be generated using provided tools or interfaces. The generation of web cookies often requires secret values, such as passwords, Private Keys, or other cryptographic seed values. Once forged, adversaries may use these web cookies to access resources (Web Session Cookie), which may bypass multi-factor and other authentication protection mechanisms.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1606/001", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor for anomalous authentication activity, such as logons or other user session activity associated with unknown accounts. Monitor for unexpected and abnormal access to resources, including access of websites and cloud-based applications by the same user in different locations or by different systems that do not match expected configurations.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Web Credential: Web Credential Usage", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1606"}
{"ID": "T1621", "name": "Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA) mechanisms and gain access to accounts by generating MFA requests sent to users. Adversaries in possession of credentials to Valid Accounts may be unable to complete the login process if they lack access to the 2FA or MFA mechanisms required as an additional credential and security control. To circumvent this, adversaries may abuse the automatic generation of push notifications to MFA services such as Duo Push, Microsoft Authenticator, Okta, or similar services to have the user grant access to their account. In some cases, adversaries may continuously repeat login attempts in order to bombard users with MFA push notifications, SMS messages, and phone calls, potentially resulting in the user finally accepting the authentication request in response to \u201cMFA fatigue.\u201d", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1621", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor user account logs as well as 2FA/MFA application logs for suspicious events: unusual login attempt source location, mismatch in location of login attempt and smart device receiving 2FA/MFA request prompts, and high volume of repeated login attempts, all of which may indicate user's primary credentials have been compromised minus 2FA/MFA mechanism.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Logon Session: Logon Session Metadata, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1040", "name": "Network Sniffing", "text": "Adversaries may sniff network traffic to capture information about an environment, including authentication material passed over the network. Network sniffing refers to using the network interface on a system to monitor or capture information sent over a wired or wireless connection. An adversary may place a network interface into promiscuous mode to passively access data in transit over the network, or use span ports to capture a larger amount of data. Data captured via this technique may include user credentials, especially those sent over an insecure, unencrypted protocol. Techniques for name service resolution poisoning, such as LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay, can also be used to capture credentials to websites, proxies, and internal systems by redirecting traffic to an adversary. Network sniffing may also reveal configuration details, such as running services, version numbers, and other network characteristics (e.g. IP addresses, hostnames, VLAN IDs) necessary for subsequent Lateral Movement and/or Defense Evasion activities. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may still be able to use traffic mirroring services to sniff network traffic from virtual machines. For example, AWS Traffic Mirroring, GCP Packet Mirroring, and Azure vTap allow users to define specified instances to collect traffic from and specified targets to send collected traffic to. Often, much of this traffic will be in cleartext due to the use of TLS termination at the load balancer level to reduce the strain of encrypting and decrypting traffic. The adversary can then use exfiltration techniques such as Transfer Data to Cloud Account in order to access the sniffed traffic. On network devices, adversaries may perform network captures using Network Device CLI commands such as `monitor capture`.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1040", "tactics": "Credential Access, Discovery", "detection": "Detecting the events leading up to sniffing network traffic may be the best method of detection. From the host level, an adversary would likely need to perform a Adversary-in-the-Middle attack against other devices on a wired network in order to capture traffic that was not to or from the current compromised system. This change in the flow of information is detectable at the enclave network level. Monitor for ARP spoofing and gratuitous ARP broadcasts. Detecting compromised network devices is a bit more challenging. Auditing administrator logins, configuration changes, and device images is required to detect malicious changes. In cloud-based environments, monitor for the creation of new traffic mirrors or modification of existing traffic mirrors. For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for the capture of network traffic.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1539", "name": "Steal Web Session Cookie", "text": "An adversary may steal web application or service session cookies and use them to gain access to web applications or Internet services as an authenticated user without needing credentials. Web applications and services often use session cookies as an authentication token after a user has authenticated to a website. Cookies are often valid for an extended period of time, even if the web application is not actively used. Cookies can be found on disk, in the process memory of the browser, and in network traffic to remote systems. Additionally, other applications on the targets machine might store sensitive authentication cookies in memory (e.g. apps which authenticate to cloud services). Session cookies can be used to bypasses some multi-factor authentication protocols. There are several examples of malware targeting cookies from web browsers on the local system. There are also open source frameworks such as `Evilginx2` and `Muraena` that can gather session cookies through a malicious proxy (ex: Adversary-in-the-Middle) that can be set up by an adversary and used in phishing campaigns. After an adversary acquires a valid cookie, they can then perform a Web Session Cookie technique to login to the corresponding web application.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor for attempts to access files and repositories on a local system that are used to store browser session cookies. Monitor for attempts by programs to inject into or dump browser process memory.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "File: File Access, Process: Process Access", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1649", "name": "Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates", "text": "Adversaries may steal or forge certificates used for authentication to access remote systems or resources. Digital certificates are often used to sign and encrypt messages and/or files. Certificates are also used as authentication material. For example, Azure AD device certificates and Active Directory Certificate Services (AD CS) certificates bind to an identity and can be used as credentials for domain accounts. Authentication certificates can be both stolen and forged. For example, AD CS certificates can be stolen from encrypted storage (in the Registry or files), misplaced certificate files (i.e. Unsecured Credentials), or directly from the Windows certificate store via various crypto APIs. With appropriate enrollment rights, users and/or machines within a domain can also request and/or manually renew certificates from enterprise certificate authorities (CA). This enrollment process defines various settings and permissions associated with the certificate. Of note, the certificate\u2019s extended key usage (EKU) values define signing, encryption, and authentication use cases, while the certificate\u2019s subject alternative name (SAN) values define the certificate owner\u2019s alternate names. Abusing certificates for authentication credentials may enable other behaviors such as Lateral Movement. Certificate-related misconfigurations may also enable opportunities for Privilege Escalation, by way of allowing users to impersonate or assume privileged accounts or permissions via the identities (SANs) associated with a certificate. These abuses may also enable Persistence via stealing or forging certificates that can be used as Valid Accounts for the duration of the certificate's validity, despite user password resets. Authentication certificates can also be stolen and forged for machine accounts. Adversaries who have access to root (or subordinate) CA certificate private keys (or mechanisms protecting/managing these keys) may also establish Persistence by forging arbitrary authentication certificates for the victim domain (known as \u201cgolden\u201d certificates). Adversaries may also target certificates and related services in order to access other forms of credentials, such as Golden Ticket ticket-granting tickets (TGT) or NTLM plaintext.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1649", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Credential Request, Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1552", "name": "Unsecured Credentials", "text": "Adversaries may search compromised systems to find and obtain insecurely stored credentials. These credentials can be stored and/or misplaced in many locations on a system, including plaintext files (e.g. Bash History), operating system or application-specific repositories (e.g. Credentials in Registry), or other specialized files/artifacts (e.g. Private Keys).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "While detecting adversaries accessing credentials may be difficult without knowing they exist in the environment, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information. Monitor for suspicious file access activity, specifically indications that a process is reading multiple files in a short amount of time and/or using command-line arguments indicative of searching for credential material (ex: regex patterns). These may be indicators of automated/scripted credential access behavior. Monitoring when the user's .bashhistory. Additionally, monitor processes for applications that can be used to query the Registry, such as Reg, and collect command parameters that may indicate credentials are being searched. Correlate activity with related suspicious behavior that may indicate an active intrusion to reduce false positives.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Process: Process Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Access", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1552.008", "name": "Unsecured Credentials: Chat Messages", "text": "Adversaries may directly collect unsecured credentials stored or passed through user communication services. Credentials may be sent and stored in user chat communication applications such as email, chat services like Slack or Teams, collaboration tools like Jira or Trello, and any other services that support user communication. Users may share various forms of credentials (such as usernames and passwords, API keys, or authentication tokens) on private or public corporate internal communications channels. Rather than accessing the stored chat logs (i.e., Credentials In Files), adversaries may directly access credentials within these services on the user endpoint, through servers hosting the services, or through administrator portals for cloud hosted services. Adversaries may also compromise integration tools like Slack Workflows to automatically search through messages to extract user credentials. These credentials may then be abused to perform follow-on activities such as lateral movement or privilege escalation .", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/008", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1552"}
{"ID": "T1552.005", "name": "Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to access the Cloud Instance Metadata API to collect credentials and other sensitive data. Most cloud service providers support a Cloud Instance Metadata API which is a service provided to running virtual instances that allows applications to access information about the running virtual instance. Available information generally includes name, security group, and additional metadata including sensitive data such as credentials and UserData scripts that may contain additional secrets. The Instance Metadata API is provided as a convenience to assist in managing applications and is accessible by anyone who can access the instance. A cloud metadata API has been used in at least one high profile compromise. If adversaries have a presence on the running virtual instance, they may query the Instance Metadata API directly to identify credentials that grant access to additional resources. Additionally, adversaries may exploit a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in a public facing web proxy that allows them to gain access to the sensitive information via a request to the Instance Metadata API. The de facto standard across cloud service providers is to host the Instance Metadata API at http[:]//169.254.169.254.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/005", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "Monitor access to the Instance Metadata API and look for anomalous queries. It may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained such as in Valid Accounts.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1552"}
{"ID": "T1552.001", "name": "Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files", "text": "Adversaries may search local file systems and remote file shares for files containing insecurely stored credentials. These can be files created by users to store their own credentials, shared credential stores for a group of individuals, configuration files containing passwords for a system or service, or source code/binary files containing embedded passwords. It is possible to extract passwords from backups or saved virtual machines through OS Credential Dumping. Passwords may also be obtained from Group Policy Preferences stored on the Windows Domain Controller. In cloud and/or containerized environments, authenticated user and service account credentials are often stored in local configuration and credential files. They may also be found as parameters to deployment commands in container logs. In some cases, these files can be copied and reused on another machine or the contents can be read and then used to authenticate without needing to copy any files.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1552/001", "tactics": "Credential Access", "detection": "While detecting adversaries accessing these files may be difficult without knowing they exist in the first place, it may be possible to detect adversary use of credentials they have obtained. Monitor the command-line arguments of executing processes for suspicious words or regular expressions that may indicate searching for a password (for example: password, pwd, login, secure, or credentials). See Valid Accounts for more information.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1552"}
{"ID": "T1087", "name": "Account Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of valid accounts, usernames, or email addresses on a system or within a compromised environment. This information can help adversaries determine which accounts exist, which can aid in follow-on behavior such as brute-forcing, spear-phishing attacks, or account takeovers (e.g., Valid Accounts). Adversaries may use several methods to enumerate accounts, including abuse of existing tools, built-in commands, and potential misconfigurations that leak account names and roles or permissions in the targeted environment. For examples, cloud environments typically provide easily accessible interfaces to obtain user lists. On hosts, adversaries can use default PowerShell and other command line functionality to identify accounts. Information about email addresses and accounts may also be extracted by searching an infected system\u2019s files.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Monitor for processes that can be used to enumerate user accounts, such as net.exe and net1.exe, especially when executed in quick succession.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1087.004", "name": "Account Discovery: Cloud Account", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of cloud accounts. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find accounts. The Get-MsolRoleMember PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain account names given a role or permissions group in Office 365. The Azure CLI (AZ CLI) also provides an interface to obtain user accounts with authenticated access to a domain. The command az ad user list will list all users within a domain. The AWS command aws iam list-users may be used to obtain a list of users in the current account while aws iam list-roles can obtain IAM roles that have a specified path prefix. In GCP, gcloud iam service-accounts list and gcloud projects get-iam-policy may be used to obtain a listing of service accounts and users in a project.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/004", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "Monitor processes, command-line arguments, and logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud accounts, including the use of calls to cloud APIs that perform account discovery. System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment, and also to an extent in normal network operations. Therefore discovery data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1087"}
{"ID": "T1087.003", "name": "Account Discovery: Email Account", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of email addresses and accounts. Adversaries may try to dump Exchange address lists such as global address lists (GALs). In on-premises Exchange and Exchange Online, theGet-GlobalAddressList PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain email addresses and accounts from a domain using an authenticated session. In Google Workspace, the GAL is shared with Microsoft Outlook users through the Google Workspace Sync for Microsoft Outlook (GWSMO) service. Additionally, the Google Workspace Directory allows for users to get a listing of other users within the organization.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1087/003", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1087"}
{"ID": "T1580", "name": "Cloud Infrastructure Discovery", "text": "An adversary may attempt to discover infrastructure and resources that are available within an infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environment. This includes compute service resources such as instances, virtual machines, and snapshots as well as resources of other services including the storage and database services. Cloud providers offer methods such as APIs and commands issued through CLIs to serve information about infrastructure. For example, AWS provides a DescribeInstances API within the Amazon EC2 API that can return information about one or more instances within an account, the ListBuckets API that returns a list of all buckets owned by the authenticated sender of the request, the HeadBucket API to determine a bucket\u2019s existence along with access permissions of the request sender, or the GetPublicAccessBlock API to retrieve access block configuration for a bucket. Similarly, GCP's Cloud SDK CLI provides the gcloud compute instances list command to list all Google Compute Engine instances in a project , and Azure's CLI command az vm list lists details of virtual machines. In addition to API commands, adversaries can utilize open source tools to discover cloud storage infrastructure through Wordlist Scanning. An adversary may enumerate resources using a compromised user's access keys to determine which are available to that user. The discovery of these available resources may help adversaries determine their next steps in the Cloud environment, such as establishing Persistence.An adversary may also use this information to change the configuration to make the bucket publicly accessible, allowing data to be accessed without authentication. Adversaries have also may use infrastructure discovery APIs such as DescribeDBInstances to determine size, owner, permissions, and network ACLs of database resources. Adversaries can use this information to determine the potential value of databases and discover the requirements to access them. Unlike in Cloud Service Discovery, this technique focuses on the discovery of components of the provided services rather than the services themselves.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1580", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "Establish centralized logging for the activity of cloud infrastructure components. Monitor logs for actions that could be taken to gather information about cloud infrastructure, including the use of discovery API calls by new or unexpected users and enumerations from unknown or malicious IP addresses. To reduce false positives, valid change management procedures could introduce a known identifier that is logged with the change (e.g., tag or header) if supported by the cloud provider, to help distinguish valid, expected actions from malicious ones.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration, Instance: Instance Enumeration, Snapshot: Snapshot Enumeration, Volume: Volume Enumeration", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1538", "name": "Cloud Service Dashboard", "text": "An adversary may use a cloud service dashboard GUI with stolen credentials to gain useful information from an operational cloud environment, such as specific services, resources, and features. For example, the GCP Command Center can be used to view all assets, findings of potential security risks, and to run additional queries, such as finding public IP addresses and open ports. Depending on the configuration of the environment, an adversary may be able to enumerate more information via the graphical dashboard than an API. This allows the adversary to gain information without making any API requests.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1538", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "Monitor account activity logs to see actions performed and activity associated with the cloud service management console. Some cloud providers, such as AWS, provide distinct log events for login attempts to the management console.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, User Account: User Account Authentication", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1526", "name": "Cloud Service Discovery", "text": "An adversary may attempt to enumerate the cloud services running on a system after gaining access. These methods can differ from platform-as-a-service (PaaS), to infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS), or software-as-a-service (SaaS). Many services exist throughout the various cloud providers and can include Continuous Integration and Continuous Delivery (CI/CD), Lambda Functions, Azure AD, etc. They may also include security services, such as AWS GuardDuty and Microsoft Defender for Cloud, and logging services, such as AWS CloudTrail and Google Cloud Audit Logs. Adversaries may attempt to discover information about the services enabled throughout the environment. Azure tools and APIs, such as the Azure AD Graph API and Azure Resource Manager API, can enumerate resources and services, including applications, management groups, resources and policy definitions, and their relationships that are accessible by an identity. For example, Stormspotter is an open source tool for enumerating and constructing a graph for Azure resources and services, and Pacu is an open source AWS exploitation framework that supports several methods for discovering cloud services. Adversaries may use the information gained to shape follow-on behaviors, such as targeting data or credentials from enumerated services or evading identified defenses through Disable or Modify Tools or Disable or Modify Cloud Logs.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1526", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "Cloud service discovery techniques will likely occur throughout an operation where an adversary is targeting cloud-based systems and services. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events that look like cloud service discovery may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Monitor cloud service usage for anomalous behavior that may indicate adversarial presence within the environment.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1619", "name": "Cloud Storage Object Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may enumerate objects in cloud storage infrastructure. Adversaries may use this information during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including requesting all or specific objects from cloud storage. Similar to File and Directory Discovery on a local host, after identifying available storage services (i.e. Cloud Infrastructure Discovery) adversaries may access the contents/objects stored in cloud infrastructure. Cloud service providers offer APIs allowing users to enumerate objects stored within cloud storage. Examples include ListObjectsV2 in AWS and List Blobs in Azure .", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1619", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Collection and Exfiltration, based on the information obtained. Monitor cloud logs for API calls used for file or object enumeration for unusual activity.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access, Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Enumeration", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1654", "name": "Log Enumeration", "text": "Adversaries may enumerate system and service logs to find useful data. These logs may highlight various types of valuable insights for an adversary, such as user authentication records (Account Discovery), security or vulnerable software (Software Discovery), or hosts within a compromised network (Remote System Discovery). Host binaries may be leveraged to collect system logs. Examples include using `wevtutil.exe` or PowerShell on Windows to access and/or export security event information. In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage utilities such as the Azure VM Agent\u2019s `CollectGuestLogs.exe` to collect security logs from cloud hosted infrastructure. Adversaries may also target centralized logging infrastructure such as SIEMs. Logs may also be bulk exported and sent to adversary-controlled infrastructure for offline analysis.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1654", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1046", "name": "Network Service Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of services running on remote hosts and local network infrastructure devices, including those that may be vulnerable to remote software exploitation. Common methods to acquire this information include port and/or vulnerability scans using tools that are brought onto a system. Within cloud environments, adversaries may attempt to discover services running on other cloud hosts. Additionally, if the cloud environment is connected to a on-premises environment, adversaries may be able to identify services running on non-cloud systems as well. Within macOS environments, adversaries may use the native Bonjour application to discover services running on other macOS hosts within a network. The Bonjour mDNSResponder daemon automatically registers and advertises a host\u2019s registered services on the network. For example, adversaries can use a mDNS query (such as dns-sd -B tcp .) to find other systems broadcasting the ssh service.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1046", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Normal, benign system and network events from legitimate remote service scanning may be uncommon, depending on the environment and how they are used. Legitimate open port and vulnerability scanning may be conducted within the environment and will need to be deconflicted with any detection capabilities developed. Network intrusion detection systems can also be used to identify scanning activity. Monitor for process use of the networks and inspect intra-network flows to detect port scans.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Service: Cloud Service Enumeration, Command: Command Execution, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1201", "name": "Password Policy Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to access detailed information about the password policy used within an enterprise network or cloud environment. Password policies are a way to enforce complex passwords that are difficult to guess or crack through Brute Force. This information may help the adversary to create a list of common passwords and launch dictionary and/or brute force attacks which adheres to the policy (e.g. if the minimum password length should be 8, then not trying passwords such as 'pass123'; not checking for more than 3-4 passwords per account if the lockout is set to 6 as to not lock out accounts). Password policies can be set and discovered on Windows, Linux, and macOS systems via various command shell utilities such as net accounts (/domain), Get-ADDefaultDomainPasswordPolicy, chage -l <username>, cat /etc/pam.d/common-password, and pwpolicy getaccountpolicies . Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to discover password policy information (e.g. show aaa, show aaa common-criteria policy all). Password policies can be discovered in cloud environments using available APIs such as GetAccountPasswordPolicy in AWS .", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1201", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "Monitor logs and processes for tools and command line arguments that may indicate they're being used for password policy discovery. Correlate that activity with other suspicious activity from the originating system to reduce potential false positives from valid user or administrator activity. Adversaries will likely attempt to find the password policy early in an operation and the activity is likely to happen with other Discovery activity.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: Process Creation, User Account: User Account Metadata", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1069", "name": "Permission Groups Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to discover group and permission settings. This information can help adversaries determine which user accounts and groups are available, the membership of users in particular groups, and which users and groups have elevated permissions. Adversaries may attempt to discover group permission settings in many different ways. This data may provide the adversary with information about the compromised environment that can be used in follow-on activity and targeting.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Monitor container logs for commands and/or API calls related to listing permissions for pods and nodes, such as kubectl auth can-i.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Group: Group Enumeration, Group: Group Metadata, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1069.003", "name": "Permission Groups Discovery: Cloud Groups", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to find cloud groups and permission settings. The knowledge of cloud permission groups can help adversaries determine the particular roles of users and groups within an environment, as well as which users are associated with a particular group. With authenticated access there are several tools that can be used to find permissions groups. The Get-MsolRole PowerShell cmdlet can be used to obtain roles and permissions groups for Exchange and Office 365 accounts . Azure CLI (AZ CLI) and the Google Cloud Identity Provider API also provide interfaces to obtain permissions groups. The command az ad user get-member-groups will list groups associated to a user account for Azure while the API endpoint GET https://cloudidentity.googleapis.com/v1/groups lists group resources available to a user for Google. In AWS, the commands `ListRolePolicies` and `ListAttachedRolePolicies` allow users to enumerate the policies attached to a role. Adversaries may attempt to list ACLs for objects to determine the owner and other accounts with access to the object, for example, via the AWS GetBucketAcl API . Using this information an adversary can target accounts with permissions to a given object or leverage accounts they have already compromised to access the object.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1069/003", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Activity and account logs for the cloud services can also be monitored for suspicious commands that are anomalous compared to a baseline of normal activity.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Group: Group Enumeration, Group: Group Metadata, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1069"}
{"ID": "T1518", "name": "Software Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of software and software versions that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. Adversaries may use the information from Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Adversaries may attempt to enumerate software for a variety of reasons, such as figuring out what security measures are present or if the compromised system has a version of software that is vulnerable to Exploitation for Privilege Escalation.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1518.001", "name": "Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of security software, configurations, defensive tools, and sensors that are installed on a system or in a cloud environment. This may include things such as firewall rules and anti-virus. Adversaries may use the information from Security Software Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Example commands that can be used to obtain security software information are netsh, reg query with Reg, dir with cmd, and Tasklist, but other indicators of discovery behavior may be more specific to the type of software or security system the adversary is looking for. It is becoming more common to see macOS malware perform checks for LittleSnitch and KnockKnock software. Adversaries may also utilize cloud APIs to discover the configurations of firewall rules within an environment. For example, the permitted IP ranges, ports or user accounts for the inbound/outbound rules of security groups, virtual firewalls established within AWS for EC2 and/or VPC instances, can be revealed by the DescribeSecurityGroups action with various request parameters.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1518/001", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as lateral movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. In cloud environments, additionally monitor logs for the usage of APIs that may be used to gather information about security software configurations within the environment.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Firewall: Firewall Enumeration, Firewall: Firewall Metadata, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1518"}
{"ID": "T1082", "name": "System Information Discovery", "text": "An adversary may attempt to get detailed information about the operating system and hardware, including version, patches, hotfixes, service packs, and architecture. Adversaries may use the information from System Information Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Tools such as Systeminfo can be used to gather detailed system information. If running with privileged access, a breakdown of system data can be gathered through the systemsetup configuration tool on macOS. As an example, adversaries with user-level access can execute the df -aH command to obtain currently mounted disks and associated freely available space. Adversaries may also leverage a Network Device CLI on network devices to gather detailed system information (e.g. show version). System Information Discovery combined with information gathered from other forms of discovery and reconnaissance can drive payload development and concealment. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers such as AWS, GCP, and Azure allow access to instance and virtual machine information via APIs. Successful authenticated API calls can return data such as the operating system platform and status of a particular instance or the model view of a virtual machine.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1082", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, Network Device CLI commands may also be used to gather detailed system information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. In cloud-based systems, native logging can be used to identify access to certain APIs and dashboards that may contain system information. Depending on how the environment is used, that data alone may not be useful due to benign use during normal operations.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1614", "name": "System Location Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may gather information in an attempt to calculate the geographical location of a victim host. Adversaries may use the information from System Location Discovery during automated discovery to shape follow-on behaviors, including whether or not the adversary fully infects the target and/or attempts specific actions. Adversaries may attempt to infer the location of a system using various system checks, such as time zone, keyboard layout, and/or language settings. Windows API functions such as GetLocaleInfoW can also be used to determine the locale of the host. In cloud environments, an instance's availability zone may also be discovered by accessing the instance metadata service from the instance. Adversaries may also attempt to infer the location of a victim host using IP addressing, such as via online geolocation IP-lookup services.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1614", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system location information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API, such as calling  GetLocaleInfoW to gather information. Monitor traffic flows to geo-location service provider sites, such as ip-api and ipinfo.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1049", "name": "System Network Connections Discovery", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to get a listing of network connections to or from the compromised system they are currently accessing or from remote systems by querying for information over the network. An adversary who gains access to a system that is part of a cloud-based environment may map out Virtual Private Clouds or Virtual Networks in order to determine what systems and services are connected. The actions performed are likely the same types of discovery techniques depending on the operating system, but the resulting information may include details about the networked cloud environment relevant to the adversary's goals. Cloud providers may have different ways in which their virtual networks operate. Similarly, adversaries who gain access to network devices may also perform similar discovery activities to gather information about connected systems and services. Utilities and commands that acquire this information include netstat, \"net use,\" and \"net session\" with Net. In Mac and Linux, netstat and lsof can be used to list current connections. who -a and w can be used to show which users are currently logged in, similar to \"net session\". Additionally, built-in features native to network devices and Network Device CLI may be used (e.g. show ip sockets, show tcp brief).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1049", "tactics": "Discovery", "detection": "System and network discovery techniques normally occur throughout an operation as an adversary learns the environment. Data and events should not be viewed in isolation, but as part of a chain of behavior that could lead to other activities, such as Lateral Movement, based on the information obtained. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather system and network information. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Further, Network Device CLI commands may also be used to gather system and network information with built-in features native to the network device platform. Monitor CLI activity for unexpected or unauthorized use commands being run by non-standard users from non-standard locations. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Process: OS API Execution, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1534", "name": "Internal Spearphishing", "text": "Adversaries may use internal spearphishing to gain access to additional information or exploit other users within the same organization after they already have access to accounts or systems within the environment. Internal spearphishing is multi-staged campaign where an email account is owned either by controlling the user's device with previously installed malware or by compromising the account credentials of the user. Adversaries attempt to take advantage of a trusted internal account to increase the likelihood of tricking the target into falling for the phish attempt. Adversaries may leverage Spearphishing Attachment or Spearphishing Link as part of internal spearphishing to deliver a payload or redirect to an external site to capture credentials through Input Capture on sites that mimic email login interfaces. There have been notable incidents where internal spearphishing has been used. The Eye Pyramid campaign used phishing emails with malicious attachments for lateral movement between victims, compromising nearly 18,000 email accounts in the process. The Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) compromised email accounts at the Financial Times (FT) to steal additional account credentials. Once FT learned of the campaign and began warning employees of the threat, the SEA sent phishing emails mimicking the Financial Times IT department and were able to compromise even more users.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534", "tactics": "Lateral Movement", "detection": "Network intrusion detection systems and email gateways usually do not scan internal email, but an organization can leverage the journaling-based solution which sends a copy of emails to a security service for offline analysis or incorporate service-integrated solutions using on-premise or API-based integrations to help detect internal spearphishing campaigns.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1021", "name": "Remote Services", "text": "Adversaries may use Valid Accounts to log into a service that accepts remote connections, such as telnet, SSH, and VNC. The adversary may then perform actions as the logged-on user. In an enterprise environment, servers and workstations can be organized into domains. Domains provide centralized identity management, allowing users to login using one set of credentials across the entire network. If an adversary is able to obtain a set of valid domain credentials, they could login to many different machines using remote access protocols such as secure shell (SSH) or remote desktop protocol (RDP). They could also login to accessible SaaS or IaaS services, such as those that federate their identities to the domain. Legitimate applications (such as Software Deployment Tools and other administrative programs) may utilize Remote Services to access remote hosts. For example, Apple Remote Desktop (ARD) on macOS is native software used for remote management. ARD leverages a blend of protocols, including VNC to send the screen and control buffers and SSH for secure file transfer. Adversaries can abuse applications such as ARD to gain remote code execution and perform lateral movement. In versions of macOS prior to 10.14, an adversary can escalate an SSH session to an ARD session which enables an adversary to accept TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) prompts without user interaction and gain access to data.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021", "tactics": "Lateral Movement", "detection": "Correlate use of login activity related to remote services with unusual behavior or other malicious or suspicious activity. Adversaries will likely need to learn about an environment and the relationships between systems through Discovery techniques prior to attempting Lateral Movement. Use of applications such as ARD may be legitimate depending on the environment and how it\u2019s used. Other factors, such as access patterns and activity that occurs after a remote login, may indicate suspicious or malicious behavior using these applications. Monitor for user accounts logged into systems they would not normally access or access patterns to multiple systems over a relatively short period of time. In macOS, you can review logs for \"screensharingd\" and \"Authentication\" event messages. Monitor network connections regarding remote management (ports tcp:3283 and tcp:5900) and for remote login (port tcp:22).", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Module: Module Load, Network Share: Network Share Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation, WMI: WMI Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1021.007", "name": "Remote Services: Cloud Services", "text": "Adversaries may log into accessible cloud services within a compromised environment using Valid Accounts that are synchronized with or federated to on-premises user identities. The adversary may then perform management actions or access cloud-hosted resources as the logged-on user. Many enterprises federate centrally managed user identities to cloud services, allowing users to login with their domain credentials in order to access the cloud control plane. Similarly, adversaries may connect to available cloud services through the web console or through the cloud command line interface (CLI) (e.g., Cloud API), using commands such as Connect-AZAccount for Azure PowerShell, Connect-MgGraph for Microsoft Graph PowerShell, and gcloud auth login for the Google Cloud CLI. In some cases, adversaries may be able to authenticate to these services via Application Access Token instead of a username and password.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/007", "tactics": "Lateral Movement", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1021"}
{"ID": "T1021.008", "name": "Remote Services: Direct Cloud VM Connections", "text": "Adversaries may leverage Valid Accounts to log directly into accessible cloud hosted compute infrastructure through cloud native methods. Many cloud providers offer interactive connections to virtual infrastructure that can be accessed through the Cloud API, such as Azure Serial Console, AWS EC2 Instance Connect, and AWS System Manager.. Methods of authentication for these connections can include passwords, application access tokens, or SSH keys. These cloud native methods may, by default, allow for privileged access on the host with SYSTEM or root level access. Adversaries may utilize these cloud native methods to directly access virtual infrastructure and pivot through an environment. These connections typically provide direct console access to the VM rather than the execution of scripts (i.e., Cloud Administration Command).", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1021/008", "tactics": "Lateral Movement", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1021"}
{"ID": "T1080", "name": "Taint Shared Content", "text": "Adversaries may deliver payloads to remote systems by adding content to shared storage locations, such as network drives or internal code repositories. Content stored on network drives or in other shared locations may be tainted by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to otherwise valid files. Once a user opens the shared tainted content, the malicious portion can be executed to run the adversary's code on a remote system. Adversaries may use tainted shared content to move laterally. A directory share pivot is a variation on this technique that uses several other techniques to propagate malware when users access a shared network directory. It uses Shortcut Modification of directory .LNK files that use Masquerading to look like the real directories, which are hidden through Hidden Files and Directories. The malicious .LNK-based directories have an embedded command that executes the hidden malware file in the directory and then opens the real intended directory so that the user's expected action still occurs. When used with frequently used network directories, the technique may result in frequent reinfections and broad access to systems and potentially to new and higher privileged accounts. Adversaries may also compromise shared network directories through binary infections by appending or prepending its code to the healthy binary on the shared network directory. The malware may modify the original entry point (OEP) of the healthy binary to ensure that it is executed before the legitimate code. The infection could continue to spread via the newly infected file when it is executed by a remote system. These infections may target both binary and non-binary formats that end with extensions including, but not limited to, .EXE, .DLL, .SCR, .BAT, and/or .VBS.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1080", "tactics": "Lateral Movement", "detection": "Processes that write or overwrite many files to a network shared directory may be suspicious. Monitor processes that are executed from removable media for malicious or abnormal activity such as network connections due to Command and Control and possible network Discovery techniques. Frequently scan shared network directories for malicious files, hidden files, .LNK files, and other file types that may not typical exist in directories used to share specific types of content.", "platforms": "Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Network Share: Network Share Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1119", "name": "Automated Collection", "text": "Once established within a system or network, an adversary may use automated techniques for collecting internal data. Methods for performing this technique could include use of a Command and Scripting Interpreter to search for and copy information fitting set criteria such as file type, location, or name at specific time intervals. In cloud-based environments, adversaries may also use cloud APIs, command line interfaces, or extract, transform, and load (ETL) services to automatically collect data. This functionality could also be built into remote access tools. This technique may incorporate use of other techniques such as File and Directory Discovery and Lateral Tool Transfer to identify and move files, as well as Cloud Service Dashboard and Cloud Storage Object Discovery to identify resources in cloud environments.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1119", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Depending on the method used, actions could include common file system commands and parameters on the command-line interface within batch files or scripts. A sequence of actions like this may be unusual, depending on the system and network environment. Automated collection may occur along with other techniques such as Data Staged. As such, file access monitoring that shows an unusual process performing sequential file opens and potentially copy actions to another location on the file system for many files at once may indicate automated collection behavior. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather data. Data may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell, as well as through cloud APIs and command line interfaces.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Script: Script Execution", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1074", "name": "Data Staged", "text": "Adversaries may stage collected data in a central location or directory prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance. Adversaries may choose to stage data from a victim network in a centralized location prior to Exfiltration to minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Consider monitoring accesses and modifications to storage repositories (such as the Windows Registry), especially from suspicious processes that could be related to malicious data collection.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, File: File Creation, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1074.002", "name": "Data Staged: Remote Data Staging", "text": "Adversaries may stage data collected from multiple systems in a central location or directory on one system prior to Exfiltration. Data may be kept in separate files or combined into one file through techniques such as Archive Collected Data. Interactive command shells may be used, and common functionality within cmd and bash may be used to copy data into a staging location. In cloud environments, adversaries may stage data within a particular instance or virtual machine before exfiltration. An adversary may Create Cloud Instance and stage data in that instance. By staging data on one system prior to Exfiltration, adversaries can minimize the number of connections made to their C2 server and better evade detection.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1074/002", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Processes that appear to be reading files from disparate locations and writing them to the same directory or file may be an indication of data being staged, especially if they are suspected of performing encryption or compression on the files, such as 7zip, RAR, ZIP, or zlib. Monitor publicly writeable directories, central locations, and commonly used staging directories (recycle bin, temp folders, etc.) to regularly check for compressed or encrypted data that may be indicative of staging. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to collect and combine files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather and copy to a location. Data may also be acquired and staged through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, File: File Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1074"}
{"ID": "T1530", "name": "Data from Cloud Storage", "text": "Adversaries may access data from cloud storage. Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform. In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories). Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem. There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions. This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records. Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1530", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Monitor for unusual queries to the cloud provider's storage service. Activity originating from unexpected sources may indicate improper permissions are set that is allowing access to data. Additionally, detecting failed attempts by a user for a certain object, followed by escalation of privileges by the same user, and access to the same object may be an indication of suspicious activity.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, IaaS, Office 365, SaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1213", "name": "Data from Information Repositories", "text": "Adversaries may leverage information repositories to mine valuable information. Information repositories are tools that allow for storage of information, typically to facilitate collaboration or information sharing between users, and can store a wide variety of data that may aid adversaries in further objectives, or direct access to the target information. Adversaries may also abuse external sharing features to share sensitive documents with recipients outside of the organization. The following is a brief list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on an information repository:  Policies, procedures, and standards  Physical / logical network diagrams  System architecture diagrams  Technical system documentation  Testing / development credentials  Work / project schedules  Source code snippets  Links to network shares and other internal resources Information stored in a repository may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Specific common information repositories include web-based platforms such as Sharepoint and Confluence, specific services such as Code Repositories, IaaS databases, enterprise databases, and other storage infrastructure such as SQL Server.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. Sharepoint audit logging can also be configured to report when a user shares a resource. The user access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can also be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1213.003", "name": "Data from Information Repositories: Code Repositories", "text": "Adversaries may leverage code repositories to collect valuable information. Code repositories are tools/services that store source code and automate software builds. They may be hosted internally or privately on third party sites such as Github, GitLab, SourceForge, and BitBucket. Users typically interact with code repositories through a web application or command-line utilities such as git. Once adversaries gain access to a victim network or a private code repository, they may collect sensitive information such as proprietary source code or credentials contained within software's source code. Having access to software's source code may allow adversaries to develop Exploits, while credentials may provide access to additional resources using Valid Accounts. Note: This is distinct from Code Repositories, which focuses on conducting Reconnaissance via public code repositories.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/003", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Monitor access to code repositories, especially performed by privileged users such as Active Directory Domain or Enterprise Administrators as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access code repositories. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user-based anomalies.", "platforms": "SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1213"}
{"ID": "T1213.001", "name": "Data from Information Repositories: Confluence", "text": "Adversaries may leverage Confluence repositories to mine valuable information. Often found in development environments alongside Atlassian JIRA, Confluence is generally used to store development-related documentation, however, in general may contain more diverse categories of useful information, such as:  Policies, procedures, and standards  Physical / logical network diagrams  System architecture diagrams  Technical system documentation  Testing / development credentials  Work / project schedules  Source code snippets  Links to network shares and other internal resources", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/001", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Monitor access to Confluence repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies. User access logging within Atlassian's Confluence can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents through AccessLogFilter. Additional log storage and analysis infrastructure will likely be required for more robust detection capabilities.", "platforms": "SaaS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1213"}
{"ID": "T1213.002", "name": "Data from Information Repositories: Sharepoint", "text": "Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:  Policies, procedures, and standards  Physical / logical network diagrams  System architecture diagrams  Technical system documentation  Testing / development credentials  Work / project schedules  Source code snippets  Links to network shares and other internal resources", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1213/002", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "The user access logging within Microsoft's SharePoint can be configured to report access to certain pages and documents. . As information repositories generally have a considerably large user base, detection of malicious use can be non-trivial. At minimum, access to information repositories performed by privileged users (for example, Active Directory Domain, Enterprise, or Schema Administrators) should be closely monitored and alerted upon, as these types of accounts should generally not be used to access information repositories. If the capability exists, it may be of value to monitor and alert on users that are retrieving and viewing a large number of documents and pages; this behavior may be indicative of programmatic means being used to retrieve all data within the repository. In environments with high-maturity, it may be possible to leverage User-Behavioral Analytics (UBA) platforms to detect and alert on user based anomalies.", "platforms": "Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1213"}
{"ID": "T1114", "name": "Email Collection", "text": "Adversaries may target user email to collect sensitive information. Emails may contain sensitive data, including trade secrets or personal information, that can prove valuable to adversaries. Adversaries can collect or forward email from mail servers or clients.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "There are likely a variety of ways an adversary could collect email from a target, each with a different mechanism for detection. File access of local system email files for Exfiltration, unusual processes connecting to an email server within a network, or unusual access patterns or authentication attempts on a public-facing webmail server may all be indicators of malicious activity. Monitor processes and command-line arguments for actions that could be taken to gather local email files. Remote access tools with built-in features may interact directly with the Windows API to gather information. Information may also be acquired through Windows system management tools such as Windows Management Instrumentation and PowerShell. Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded set to true, X-MailFwdBy and X-Forwarded-To. The forwardingSMTPAddress parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox. High volumes of emails that bear the X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1114.003", "name": "Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule", "text": "Adversaries may setup email forwarding rules to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may abuse email forwarding rules to monitor the activities of a victim, steal information, and further gain intelligence on the victim or the victim\u2019s organization to use as part of further exploits or operations. Furthermore, email forwarding rules can allow adversaries to maintain persistent access to victim's emails even after compromised credentials are reset by administrators. Most email clients allow users to create inbox rules for various email functions, including forwarding to a different recipient. These rules may be created through a local email application, a web interface, or by command-line interface. Messages can be forwarded to internal or external recipients, and there are no restrictions limiting the extent of this rule. Administrators may also create forwarding rules for user accounts with the same considerations and outcomes. Any user or administrator within the organization (or adversary with valid credentials) can create rules to automatically forward all received messages to another recipient, forward emails to different locations based on the sender, and more. Adversaries may also hide the rule by making use of the Microsoft Messaging API (MAPI) to modify the rule properties, making it hidden and not visible from Outlook, OWA or most Exchange Administration tools. In some environments, administrators may be able to enable email forwarding rules that operate organization-wide rather than on individual inboxes. For example, Microsoft Exchange supports transport rules that evaluate all mail an organization receives against user-specified conditions, then performs a user-specified action on mail that adheres to those conditions. Adversaries that abuse such features may be able to enable forwarding on all or specific mail an organization receives.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/003", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Detection is challenging because all messages forwarded because of an auto-forwarding rule have the same presentation as a manually forwarded message. It is also possible for the user to not be aware of the addition of such an auto-forwarding rule and not suspect that their account has been compromised; email-forwarding rules alone will not affect the normal usage patterns or operations of the email account. This is especially true in cases with hidden auto-forwarding rules. This makes it only possible to reliably detect the existence of a hidden auto-forwarding rule by examining message tracking logs or by using a MAPI editor to notice the modified rule property values. Auto-forwarded messages generally contain specific detectable artifacts that may be present in the header; such artifacts would be platform-specific. Examples include `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` set to true, `X-MailFwdBy` and `X-Forwarded-To`. The `forwardingSMTPAddress` parameter used in a forwarding process that is managed by administrators and not by user actions. All messages for the mailbox are forwarded to the specified SMTP address. However, unlike typical client-side rules, the message does not appear as forwarded in the mailbox; it appears as if it were sent directly to the specified destination mailbox. High volumes of emails that bear the `X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AutoForwarded` header (indicating auto-forwarding) without a corresponding number of emails that match the appearance of a forwarded message may indicate that further investigation is needed at the administrator level rather than user-level.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1114"}
{"ID": "T1114.002", "name": "Email Collection: Remote Email Collection", "text": "Adversaries may target an Exchange server, Office 365, or Google Workspace to collect sensitive information. Adversaries may leverage a user's credentials and interact directly with the Exchange server to acquire information from within a network. Adversaries may also access externally facing Exchange services, Office 365, or Google Workspace to access email using credentials or access tokens. Tools such as MailSniper can be used to automate searches for specific keywords.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1114/002", "tactics": "Collection", "detection": "Monitor for unusual login activity from unknown or abnormal locations, especially for privileged accounts (ex: Exchange administrator account).", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Office 365, Windows", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, Logon Session: Logon Session Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1114"}
{"ID": "T1048", "name": "Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol", "text": "Adversaries may steal data by exfiltrating it over a different protocol than that of the existing command and control channel. The data may also be sent to an alternate network location from the main command and control server. Alternate protocols include FTP, SMTP, HTTP/S, DNS, SMB, or any other network protocol not being used as the main command and control channel. Adversaries may also opt to encrypt and/or obfuscate these alternate channels. Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol can be done using various common operating system utilities such as Net/SMB or FTP. On macOS and Linux curl may be used to invoke protocols such as HTTP/S or FTP/S to exfiltrate data from a system. Many IaaS and SaaS platforms (such as Microsoft Exchange, Microsoft SharePoint, GitHub, and AWS S3) support the direct download of files, emails, source code, and other sensitive information via the web console or Cloud API.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1048", "tactics": "Exfiltration", "detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. Analyze packet contents to detect communications that do not follow the expected protocol behavior for the port that is being used.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Network, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Access, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1567", "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service", "text": "Adversaries may use an existing, legitimate external Web service to exfiltrate data rather than their primary command and control channel. Popular Web services acting as an exfiltration mechanism may give a significant amount of cover due to the likelihood that hosts within a network are already communicating with them prior to compromise. Firewall rules may also already exist to permit traffic to these services. Web service providers also commonly use SSL/TLS encryption, giving adversaries an added level of protection.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567", "tactics": "Exfiltration", "detection": "Analyze network data for uncommon data flows (e.g., a client sending significantly more data than it receives from a server). Processes utilizing the network that do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before are suspicious. User behavior monitoring may help to detect abnormal patterns of activity.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1567.004", "name": "Exfiltration Over Web Service: Exfiltration Over Webhook", "text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data to a webhook endpoint rather than over their primary command and control channel. Webhooks are simple mechanisms for allowing a server to push data over HTTP/S to a client without the need for the client to continuously poll the server. Many public and commercial services, such as Discord, Slack, and `webhook.site`, support the creation of webhook endpoints that can be used by other services, such as Github, Jira, or Trello. When changes happen in the linked services (such as pushing a repository update or modifying a ticket), these services will automatically post the data to the webhook endpoint for use by the consuming application. Adversaries may link an adversary-owned environment to a victim-owned SaaS service to achieve repeated Automated Exfiltration of emails, chat messages, and other data. Alternatively, instead of linking the webhook endpoint to a service, an adversary can manually post staged data directly to the URL in order to exfiltrate it. Access to webhook endpoints is often over HTTPS, which gives the adversary an additional level of protection. Exfiltration leveraging webhooks can also blend in with normal network traffic if the webhook endpoint points to a commonly used SaaS application or collaboration service.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1567/004", "tactics": "Exfiltration", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Command: Command Execution, File: File Access, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1567"}
{"ID": "T1537", "name": "Transfer Data to Cloud Account", "text": "Adversaries may exfiltrate data by transferring the data, including backups of cloud environments, to another cloud account they control on the same service to avoid typical file transfers/downloads and network-based exfiltration detection. A defender who is monitoring for large transfers to outside the cloud environment through normal file transfers or over command and control channels may not be watching for data transfers to another account within the same cloud provider. Such transfers may utilize existing cloud provider APIs and the internal address space of the cloud provider to blend into normal traffic or avoid data transfers over external network interfaces. Incidents have been observed where adversaries have created backups of cloud instances and transferred them to separate accounts.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1537", "tactics": "Exfiltration", "detection": "Monitor account activity for attempts to share data, snapshots, or backups with untrusted or unusual accounts on the same cloud service provider. Monitor for anomalous file transfer activity between accounts and to untrusted VPCs. In AWS, sharing an Elastic Block Store (EBS) snapshot, either with specified users or publicly, generates a ModifySnapshotAttribute event in CloudTrail logs. Similarly, in Azure, creating a Shared Access Signature (SAS) URI for a Virtual Hard Disk (VHS) snapshot generates a \"Get Snapshot SAS URL\" event in Activity Logs.", "platforms": "IaaS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Creation, Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Metadata, Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Snapshot: Snapshot Creation, Snapshot: Snapshot Metadata, Snapshot: Snapshot Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1531", "name": "Account Access Removal", "text": "Adversaries may interrupt availability of system and network resources by inhibiting access to accounts utilized by legitimate users. Accounts may be deleted, locked, or manipulated (ex: changed credentials) to remove access to accounts. Adversaries may also subsequently log off and/or perform a System Shutdown/Reboot to set malicious changes into place. In Windows, Net utility, Set-LocalUser and Set-ADAccountPassword PowerShell cmdlets may be used by adversaries to modify user accounts. In Linux, the passwd utility may be used to change passwords. Accounts could also be disabled by Group Policy. Adversaries who use ransomware or similar attacks may first perform this and other Impact behaviors, such as Data Destruction and Defacement, in order to impede incident response/recovery before completing the Data Encrypted for Impact objective.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1531", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in deleting accounts or changing passwords, such as use of Net. Windows event logs may also designate activity associated with an adversary's attempt to remove access to an account:  Event ID 4723 - An attempt was made to change an account's password  Event ID 4724 - An attempt was made to reset an account's password  Event ID 4726 - A user account was deleted  Event ID 4740 - A user account was locked out Alerting on Net and these Event IDs may generate a high degree of false positives, so compare against baseline knowledge for how systems are typically used and correlate modification events with other indications of malicious activity where possible.", "platforms": "Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Active Directory: Active Directory Object Modification, User Account: User Account Deletion, User Account: User Account Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1485", "name": "Data Destruction", "text": "Adversaries may destroy data and files on specific systems or in large numbers on a network to interrupt availability to systems, services, and network resources. Data destruction is likely to render stored data irrecoverable by forensic techniques through overwriting files or data on local and remote drives. Common operating system file deletion commands such as del and rm often only remove pointers to files without wiping the contents of the files themselves, making the files recoverable by proper forensic methodology. This behavior is distinct from Disk Content Wipe and Disk Structure Wipe because individual files are destroyed rather than sections of a storage disk or the disk's logical structure. Adversaries may attempt to overwrite files and directories with randomly generated data to make it irrecoverable. In some cases politically oriented image files have been used to overwrite data. To maximize impact on the target organization in operations where network-wide availability interruption is the goal, malware designed for destroying data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging additional techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares.. In cloud environments, adversaries may leverage access to delete cloud storage, cloud storage accounts, machine images, and other infrastructure crucial to operations to damage an organization or their customers.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1485", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command-line parameters of binaries that could be involved in data destruction activity, such as SDelete. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as high unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories and under C:\\Windows\\System32\\. In cloud environments, the occurrence of anomalous high-volume deletion events, such as the DeleteDBCluster and DeleteGlobalCluster events in AWS, or a high quantity of data deletion events, such as DeleteBucket, within a short period of time may indicate suspicious activity.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion, Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, File: File Modification, Image: Image Deletion, Instance: Instance Deletion, Process: Process Creation, Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion, Volume: Volume Deletion", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1486", "name": "Data Encrypted for Impact", "text": "Adversaries may encrypt data on target systems or on large numbers of systems in a network to interrupt availability to system and network resources. They can attempt to render stored data inaccessible by encrypting files or data on local and remote drives and withholding access to a decryption key. This may be done in order to extract monetary compensation from a victim in exchange for decryption or a decryption key (ransomware) or to render data permanently inaccessible in cases where the key is not saved or transmitted. In the case of ransomware, it is typical that common user files like Office documents, PDFs, images, videos, audio, text, and source code files will be encrypted (and often renamed and/or tagged with specific file markers). Adversaries may need to first employ other behaviors, such as File and Directory Permissions Modification or System Shutdown/Reboot, in order to unlock and/or gain access to manipulate these files. In some cases, adversaries may encrypt critical system files, disk partitions, and the MBR. To maximize impact on the target organization, malware designed for encrypting data may have worm-like features to propagate across a network by leveraging other attack techniques like Valid Accounts, OS Credential Dumping, and SMB/Windows Admin Shares. Encryption malware may also leverage Internal Defacement, such as changing victim wallpapers, or otherwise intimidate victims by sending ransom notes or other messages to connected printers (known as \"print bombing\"). In cloud environments, storage objects within compromised accounts may also be encrypted.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1486", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in data destruction activity, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, and bcdedit. Monitor for the creation of suspicious files as well as unusual file modification activity. In particular, look for large quantities of file modifications in user directories. In some cases, monitoring for unusual kernel driver installation activity can aid in detection. In cloud environments, monitor for events that indicate storage objects have been anomalously replaced by copies.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Modification, Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Network Share: Network Share Access, Process: Process Creation", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1491", "name": "Defacement", "text": "Adversaries may modify visual content available internally or externally to an enterprise network, thus affecting the integrity of the original content. Reasons for Defacement include delivering messaging, intimidation, or claiming (possibly false) credit for an intrusion. Disturbing or offensive images may be used as a part of Defacement in order to cause user discomfort, or to pressure compliance with accompanying messages.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Monitor internal and external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1491.002", "name": "Defacement: External Defacement", "text": "An adversary may deface systems external to an organization in an attempt to deliver messaging, intimidate, or otherwise mislead an organization or users. External Defacement may ultimately cause users to distrust the systems and to question/discredit the system\u2019s integrity. Externally-facing websites are a common victim of defacement; often targeted by adversary and hacktivist groups in order to push a political message or spread propaganda. External Defacement may be used as a catalyst to trigger events, or as a response to actions taken by an organization or government. Similarly, website defacement may also be used as setup, or a precursor, for future attacks such as Drive-by Compromise.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1491/002", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Monitor external websites for unplanned content changes. Monitor application logs for abnormal behavior that may indicate attempted or successful exploitation. Use deep packet inspection to look for artifacts of common exploit traffic, such as SQL injection. Web Application Firewalls may detect improper inputs attempting exploitation.", "platforms": "IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, File: File Creation, File: File Modification, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1491"}
{"ID": "T1499", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service", "text": "Adversaries may perform Endpoint Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of services to users. Endpoint DoS can be performed by exhausting the system resources those services are hosted on or exploiting the system to cause a persistent crash condition. Example services include websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion. An Endpoint DoS denies the availability of a service without saturating the network used to provide access to the service. Adversaries can target various layers of the application stack that is hosted on the system used to provide the service. These layers include the Operating Systems (OS), server applications such as web servers, DNS servers, databases, and the (typically web-based) applications that sit on top of them. Attacking each layer requires different techniques that take advantage of bottlenecks that are unique to the respective components. A DoS attack may be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). To perform DoS attacks against endpoint resources, several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. Botnets are commonly used to conduct DDoS attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for DDoS, so many systems are used to generate requests that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to exhaust the target's resources. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks. In cases where traffic manipulation is used, there may be points in the global network (such as high traffic gateway routers) where packets can be altered and cause legitimate clients to execute code that directs network packets toward a target in high volume. This type of capability was previously used for the purposes of web censorship where client HTTP traffic was modified to include a reference to JavaScript that generated the DDoS code to overwhelm target web servers. For attacks attempting to saturate the providing network, see Network Denial of Service.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1499.003", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service: Application Exhaustion Flood", "text": "Adversaries may target resource intensive features of applications to cause a denial of service (DoS), denying availability to those applications. For example, specific features in web applications may be highly resource intensive. Repeated requests to those features may be able to exhaust system resources and deny access to the application or the server itself.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/003", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1499"}
{"ID": "T1499.004", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation", "text": "Adversaries may exploit software vulnerabilities that can cause an application or system to crash and deny availability to users. Some systems may automatically restart critical applications and services when crashes occur, but they can likely be re-exploited to cause a persistent denial of service (DoS) condition. Adversaries may exploit known or zero-day vulnerabilities to crash applications and/or systems, which may also lead to dependent applications and/or systems to be in a DoS condition. Crashed or restarted applications or systems may also have other effects such as Data Destruction, Firmware Corruption, Service Stop etc. which may further cause a DoS condition and deny availability to critical information, applications and/or systems.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/004", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1499"}
{"ID": "T1499.002", "name": "Endpoint Denial of Service: Service Exhaustion Flood", "text": "Adversaries may target the different network services provided by systems to conduct a denial of service (DoS). Adversaries often target the availability of DNS and web services, however others have been targeted as well. Web server software can be attacked through a variety of means, some of which apply generally while others are specific to the software being used to provide the service. One example of this type of attack is known as a simple HTTP flood, where an adversary sends a large number of HTTP requests to a web server to overwhelm it and/or an application that runs on top of it. This flood relies on raw volume to accomplish the objective, exhausting any of the various resources required by the victim software to provide the service. Another variation, known as a SSL renegotiation attack, takes advantage of a protocol feature in SSL/TLS. The SSL/TLS protocol suite includes mechanisms for the client and server to agree on an encryption algorithm to use for subsequent secure connections. If SSL renegotiation is enabled, a request can be made for renegotiation of the crypto algorithm. In a renegotiation attack, the adversary establishes a SSL/TLS connection and then proceeds to make a series of renegotiation requests. Because the cryptographic renegotiation has a meaningful cost in computation cycles, this can cause an impact to the availability of the service when done in volume.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of Endpoint DoS can sometimes be achieved before the effect is sufficient to cause significant impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in circuit utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an attack as it starts. In addition to network level detections, endpoint logging and instrumentation can be useful for detection. Attacks targeting web applications may generate logs in the web server, application server, and/or database server that can be used to identify the type of attack, possibly before the impact is felt. Externally monitor the availability of services that may be targeted by an Endpoint DoS.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Content, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1499"}
{"ID": "T1657", "name": "Financial Theft", "text": "Adversaries may steal monetary resources from targets through extortion, social engineering, technical theft, or other methods aimed at their own financial gain at the expense of the availability of these resources for victims. Financial theft is the ultimate objective of several popular campaign types including extortion by ransomware, business email compromise (BEC) and fraud, \"pig butchering,\" bank hacking, and exploiting cryptocurrency networks. Adversaries may Compromise Accounts to conduct unauthorized transfers of funds. In the case of business email compromise or email fraud, an adversary may utilize Impersonation of a trusted entity. Once the social engineering is successful, victims can be deceived into sending money to financial accounts controlled by an adversary. This creates the potential for multiple victims (i.e., compromised accounts as well as the ultimate monetary loss) in incidents involving financial theft. Extortion by ransomware may occur, for example, when an adversary demands payment from a victim after Data Encrypted for Impact and Exfiltration of data, followed by threatening public exposure unless payment is made to the adversary. Due to the potentially immense business impact of financial theft, an adversary may abuse the possibility of financial theft and seeking monetary gain to divert attention from their true goals such as Data Destruction and business disruption.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1657", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "No detection text provided.", "platforms": "Google Workspace, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Application Log: Application Log Content", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1490", "name": "Inhibit System Recovery", "text": "Adversaries may delete or remove built-in data and turn off services designed to aid in the recovery of a corrupted system to prevent recovery. This may deny access to available backups and recovery options. Operating systems may contain features that can help fix corrupted systems, such as a backup catalog, volume shadow copies, and automatic repair features. Adversaries may disable or delete system recovery features to augment the effects of Data Destruction and Data Encrypted for Impact. Furthermore, adversaries may disable recovery notifications, then corrupt backups. A number of native Windows utilities have been used by adversaries to disable or delete system recovery features:  vssadmin.exe can be used to delete all volume shadow copies on a system - vssadmin.exe delete shadows /all /quiet  Windows Management Instrumentation can be used to delete volume shadow copies - wmic shadowcopy delete  wbadmin.exe can be used to delete the Windows Backup Catalog - wbadmin.exe delete catalog -quiet  bcdedit.exe can be used to disable automatic Windows recovery features by modifying boot configuration data - bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures & bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no * REAgentC.exe can be used to disable Windows Recovery Environment (WinRE) repair/recovery options of an infected system On network devices, adversaries may leverage Disk Wipe to delete backup firmware images and reformat the file system, then System Shutdown/Reboot to reload the device. Together this activity may leave network devices completely inoperable and inhibit recovery operations. Adversaries may also delete \u201conline\u201d backups that are connected to their network \u2013 whether via network storage media or through folders that sync to cloud services. In cloud environments, adversaries may disable versioning and backup policies and delete snapshots, machine images, and prior versions of objects designed to be used in disaster recovery scenarios.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1490", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Use process monitoring to monitor the execution and command line parameters of binaries involved in inhibiting system recovery, such as vssadmin, wbadmin, bcdedit and REAgentC. The Windows event logs, ex. Event ID 524 indicating a system catalog was deleted, may contain entries associated with suspicious activity. Monitor the status of services involved in system recovery. Monitor the registry for changes associated with system recovery features (ex: the creation of HKEYUSER\\Software\\Policies\\Microsoft\\PreviousVersions\\DisableLocalPage). For network infrastructure devices, collect AAA logging to monitor for `erase`, `format`, and `reload` commands being run in succession.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Network, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Cloud Storage: Cloud Storage Deletion, Command: Command Execution, File: File Deletion, Process: Process Creation, Service: Service Metadata, Snapshot: Snapshot Deletion, Windows Registry: Windows Registry Key Modification", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1498", "name": "Network Denial of Service", "text": "Adversaries may perform Network Denial of Service (DoS) attacks to degrade or block the availability of targeted resources to users. Network DoS can be performed by exhausting the network bandwidth services rely on. Example resources include specific websites, email services, DNS, and web-based applications. Adversaries have been observed conducting network DoS attacks for political purposes and to support other malicious activities, including distraction, hacktivism, and extortion. A Network DoS will occur when the bandwidth capacity of the network connection to a system is exhausted due to the volume of malicious traffic directed at the resource or the network connections and network devices the resource relies on. For example, an adversary may send 10Gbps of traffic to a server that is hosted by a network with a 1Gbps connection to the internet. This traffic can be generated by a single system or multiple systems spread across the internet, which is commonly referred to as a distributed DoS (DDoS). To perform Network DoS attacks several aspects apply to multiple methods, including IP address spoofing, and botnets. Adversaries may use the original IP address of an attacking system, or spoof the source IP address to make the attack traffic more difficult to trace back to the attacking system or to enable reflection. This can increase the difficulty defenders have in defending against the attack by reducing or eliminating the effectiveness of filtering by the source address on network defense devices. For DoS attacks targeting the hosting system directly, see Endpoint Denial of Service.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of Network DoS can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect an Network DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Containers, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": false}
{"ID": "T1498.001", "name": "Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by directly sending a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Direct Network Floods are when one or more systems are used to send a high-volume of network packets towards the targeted service's network. Almost any network protocol may be used for flooding. Stateless protocols such as UDP or ICMP are commonly used but stateful protocols such as TCP can be used as well. Botnets are commonly used to conduct network flooding attacks against networks and services. Large botnets can generate a significant amount of traffic from systems spread across the global Internet. Adversaries may have the resources to build out and control their own botnet infrastructure or may rent time on an existing botnet to conduct an attack. In some of the worst cases for distributed DoS (DDoS), so many systems are used to generate the flood that each one only needs to send out a small amount of traffic to produce enough volume to saturate the target network. In such circumstances, distinguishing DDoS traffic from legitimate clients becomes exceedingly difficult. Botnets have been used in some of the most high-profile DDoS flooding attacks, such as the 2012 series of incidents that targeted major US banks.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/001", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of a network flood can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a network flood event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1498"}
{"ID": "T1498.002", "name": "Network Denial of Service: Reflection Amplification", "text": "Adversaries may attempt to cause a denial of service (DoS) by reflecting a high-volume of network traffic to a target. This type of Network DoS takes advantage of a third-party server intermediary that hosts and will respond to a given spoofed source IP address. This third-party server is commonly termed a reflector. An adversary accomplishes a reflection attack by sending packets to reflectors with the spoofed address of the victim. Similar to Direct Network Floods, more than one system may be used to conduct the attack, or a botnet may be used. Likewise, one or more reflectors may be used to focus traffic on the target. This Network DoS attack may also reduce the availability and functionality of the targeted system(s) and network. Reflection attacks often take advantage of protocols with larger responses than requests in order to amplify their traffic, commonly known as a Reflection Amplification attack. Adversaries may be able to generate an increase in volume of attack traffic that is several orders of magnitude greater than the requests sent to the amplifiers. The extent of this increase will depending upon many variables, such as the protocol in question, the technique used, and the amplifying servers that actually produce the amplification in attack volume. Two prominent protocols that have enabled Reflection Amplification Floods are DNS and NTP, though the use of several others in the wild have been documented. In particular, the memcache protocol showed itself to be a powerful protocol, with amplification sizes up to 51,200 times the requesting packet.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1498/002", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Detection of reflection amplification can sometimes be achieved before the traffic volume is sufficient to cause impact to the availability of the service, but such response time typically requires very aggressive monitoring and responsiveness or services provided by an upstream network service provider. Typical network throughput monitoring tools such as netflow, SNMP, and custom scripts can be used to detect sudden increases in network or service utilization. Real-time, automated, and qualitative study of the network traffic can identify a sudden surge in one type of protocol can be used to detect a reflection amplification DoS event as it starts. Often, the lead time may be small and the indicator of an event availability of the network or service drops. The analysis tools mentioned can then be used to determine the type of DoS causing the outage and help with remediation.", "platforms": "Azure AD, Google Workspace, IaaS, Linux, Office 365, SaaS, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": true, "sub-technique of": "T1498"}
{"ID": "T1496", "name": "Resource Hijacking", "text": "Adversaries may leverage the resources of co-opted systems to complete resource-intensive tasks, which may impact system and/or hosted service availability. One common purpose for Resource Hijacking is to validate transactions of cryptocurrency networks and earn virtual currency. Adversaries may consume enough system resources to negatively impact and/or cause affected machines to become unresponsive. Servers and cloud-based systems are common targets because of the high potential for available resources, but user endpoint systems may also be compromised and used for Resource Hijacking and cryptocurrency mining. Containerized environments may also be targeted due to the ease of deployment via exposed APIs and the potential for scaling mining activities by deploying or compromising multiple containers within an environment or cluster. Additionally, some cryptocurrency mining malware identify then kill off processes for competing malware to ensure it\u2019s not competing for resources. Adversaries may also use malware that leverages a system's network bandwidth as part of a botnet in order to facilitate Network Denial of Service campaigns and/or to seed malicious torrents. Alternatively, they may engage in proxyjacking by selling use of the victims' network bandwidth and IP address to proxyware services.", "url": "https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1496", "tactics": "Impact", "detection": "Consider monitoring process resource usage to determine anomalous activity associated with malicious hijacking of computer resources such as CPU, memory, and graphics processing resources. Monitor for suspicious use of network resources associated with cryptocurrency mining software. Monitor for common cryptomining software process names and files on local systems that may indicate compromise and resource usage.", "platforms": "Containers, IaaS, Linux, Windows, macOS", "data sources": "Command: Command Execution, File: File Creation, Network Traffic: Network Connection Creation, Network Traffic: Network Traffic Flow, Process: Process Creation, Sensor Health: Host Status", "is sub-technique": false}